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CMBN

Cembra Money Bank AG

CHF 96.45 2.8B market cap February 21, 2026
Cembra Money Bank AG CMBN BUFFETT / MUNGER / KLARMAN SUMMARY
1 SNAPSHOT
PriceCHF 96.45
Market Cap2.8B
2 BUSINESS

Cembra Money Bank is a well-managed Swiss consumer finance specialist with predictable earnings, a 13-year dividend growth streak, and narrow regulatory moat. At CHF 96.45 (P/E 15.8x, P/B 2.1x, yield 4.4%), the stock is fairly to slightly overvalued after a 70%+ rally from 2023 lows. ROE of 13.7% is respectable but below the 15% quality threshold. Key structural risks include Swiss interest rate cap compression (SNB at 0%), personal loan shrinkage, and limited growth opportunities in the mature Swiss market. The extraordinary dividend and improving cost efficiency are positive signals, but insufficient to justify paying above intrinsic value. Wait for a pullback to CHF 70 (P/E ~11.4x, yield ~6.6%) for adequate margin of safety.

3 MOAT NARROW

Swiss banking license requirement (FINMA), 4,000+ car dealer distribution network, 20+ years consumer credit data from GE Capital era, regulated market limiting foreign fintech entry.

4 MANAGEMENT
CEO: Holger Laubenthal

Excellent - 13 consecutive years of ordinary dividend increases (CHF 2.85 to CHF 4.60). Extraordinary CHF 1.00 dividend in 2025. No aggressive M&A. Disciplined cost management driving C/I ratio from 51% to 45%.

5 ECONOMICS
47.7% Op Margin
13.7% ROIC
13.7% ROE
15.79x P/E
6 VALUATION
DCF Range70 - 85

Overvalued by 14-38%. No margin of safety at current price.

7 MUNGER INVERSION
Kill Event Severity P() E[Loss]
Swiss interest rate cap compression as SNB cuts rates to 0%, mechanically reducing maximum APR on consumer loans from 10% toward lower levels, squeezing net interest margin. HIGH - -
Personal loan portfolio structural decline (-6% in FY2025), credit cycle deterioration risk, fintech competition in BNPL/cards. MED - -
8 KLARMAN LENS
Downside Case

Swiss interest rate cap compression as SNB cuts rates to 0%, mechanically reducing maximum APR on consumer loans from 10% toward lower levels, squeezing net interest margin.

Why Market Right

Further SNB rate cuts could push interest rate cap below 10% APR; Personal loan portfolio shrinkage accelerating; BNPL segment declining 17% -- competitive pressure from Klarna et al.

Catalysts

Cost/income ratio reaching 39% target (from 45.2%) could add 5-10% to EPS; ROE reaching 15% management target would support re-rating; New strategic cycle announcement expected Q4 2026; Extraordinary dividend signals excess capital distribution

9 VERDICT WAIT
B+ Quality Strong - 17.6% Tier 1 capital ratio, well above regulatory minimums. Conservative Swiss bank with stable funding (45% deposits, 55% wholesale). CHF 1.35B equity base.
Strong BuyCHF 55
BuyCHF 70
Fair ValueCHF 85

Accumulate below CHF 70, Strong Buy below CHF 55. At current CHF 96.45, no action.

🧠 ULTRATHINK Deep Philosophical Analysis

CMBN - Ultrathink Analysis

The Core Question

What is Cembra Money Bank, really? Strip away the Swiss precision, the GE Capital pedigree, the reassuring acronyms of FINMA and SNB. What you are left with is a company that lends money to individuals at interest rates near the regulatory ceiling, funds itself through retail deposits and wholesale markets at much lower rates, and hopes that not too many borrowers default.

That is the consumer lending business in one sentence. And the question every investor must answer is: does Cembra do this well enough, and with sufficient structural protection, to justify paying 2.1 times book value for the privilege of ownership?

The Swiss Fortress Illusion

There is a seductive narrative around Swiss financial institutions. Switzerland is stable. The franc is strong. FINMA is rigorous. The economy hardly ever contracts. Unemployment never breaches 4%. It is the land of precision and prudence.

All of this is true. And all of it is already priced into the stock at 15.8 times earnings and 2.1 times book. The question is not whether Switzerland is safe -- it manifestly is -- but whether the safety premium embedded in Cembra's valuation is too generous.

Consider this: European consumer finance peers trade at 10-14x earnings and 0.8-1.5x book value. Cembra commands a 30-50% premium. The premium is partly warranted by genuinely lower risk (loss rate of 1.1% vs European peers at 2-4%), but it also means that the margin of safety is thin. You are paying for perfection. Perfection rarely persists.

Charlie Munger would ask: what do I know that the market does not? At CHF 96, the answer is: nothing. The market has correctly identified Cembra as a well-run Swiss bank and priced it accordingly.

The Migros Lesson

The most instructive episode in Cembra's recent history is the termination of the Migros Cumulus Mastercard partnership. This was announced in August 2021, and the stock crashed 37% over the following months. The partnership had been in place for 15 years. It was a cornerstone of Cembra's credit card business. And Migros simply decided to bring the card in-house.

What does this tell us about the moat? Several things, none of them reassuring.

First, the switching costs in consumer credit cards are lower than they appear. When Migros decided to leave, it left. There was no contractual fortress, no irreplaceable technology, no customer lock-in that prevented the departure. The relationship was commercial, not structural.

Second, Cembra's response -- launching its own Certo! card family -- was competent but not transformative. It replaced some of the lost volume but not the brand association with Switzerland's largest retailer. The company adapted. It survived. But it did not demonstrate the kind of irreplaceable competitive advantage that justifies a premium valuation.

Third, the stock's subsequent recovery -- from a low of roughly CHF 54 in late 2023 to CHF 96 today -- was driven not by any fundamental improvement in competitive position but by cost-cutting, margin expansion, and the general recovery in financial sector valuations. The business quality did not improve. The market's perception of the business normalized.

This is exactly the kind of pattern that value investors should recognize: a stock that cratered on a genuine fundamental setback, recovered to fair value on sentiment improvement, and now sits at a price that offers no margin of safety for the next setback.

The Interest Rate Trap

Here is the structural issue that should worry any long-term holder. Swiss consumer credit interest rates are capped by regulation. The cap is calculated as a formula: SARON (the Swiss overnight rate) plus a fixed margin of 10 percentage points for cash loans.

When the SNB's policy rate was 1.75% in late 2023, the maximum APR for consumer loans was around 12%. That gave Cembra healthy margins. But the SNB has since cut rates six consecutive times to 0.00%. The maximum APR is now 10%. If SARON goes negative -- as it was for years before 2022 -- the cap falls further.

This is not a theoretical risk. It is a mechanical, mathematical certainty embedded in Swiss law. As rates fall, Cembra's revenue ceiling falls. The company can partly offset this by reducing its own funding costs (which have dropped from 1.53% to 1.33%), but the NIM compression is real and directionally negative.

Warren Buffett has often said he avoids businesses where the economics depend on predicting interest rates. Cembra does not depend on predicting rates -- it is structurally vulnerable to their trajectory. The company cannot charge more than the cap allows, regardless of its own cost of funds, credit quality, or competitive position.

In a zero-rate world, Cembra's net interest margin compresses from 5.5% toward 4.5-5.0%. On a CHF 6.6 billion receivables book, each 10 basis points of NIM compression costs roughly CHF 6.6 million in pre-tax income. A 100bp compression wipes out CHF 66 million -- nearly 37% of current net income.

The Owner's Mindset

Would Buffett own Cembra for 20 years? I doubt it.

The positives are real: 13 years of unbroken dividend growth, conservative management, Swiss regulatory protection, stable loss performance. This is a well-managed bank.

But the negatives are equally real: ROE below 15%, no pricing power (regulatory cap), single-country exposure (Switzerland is great but limits growth), no competitive advantage that prevents a well-capitalized competitor from replicating the business model, and structural headwinds from falling interest rates and shrinking personal loan demand.

Buffett wants businesses that can reinvest at high rates of return for decades. Cembra returns capital to shareholders because it has limited reinvestment opportunities. The 69% payout ratio is generous but also an admission that the business cannot compound its own capital at attractive rates. The extraordinary CHF 1.00 dividend in 2025 confirms this: management has more capital than it can productively deploy.

Compare this to Visa or Mastercard -- businesses Buffett loves -- which can reinvest nearly all earnings at 50%+ returns on capital. Cembra earns 13.7% on equity, pays out 69%, and retains the rest to grow receivables at 0-3% annually. The math of compounding does not favor the long-term Cembra holder.

Risk Inversion

Let me invert. What would make Cembra a great investment?

Scenario 1: SNB raises rates to 2%+ and the interest rate cap rises to 12%+. NIM expands. Earnings jump. The stock re-rates. Probability: Low. The global trend is toward lower-for-longer rates. The SNB is at zero with no urgency to tighten.

Scenario 2: Management achieves the 39% cost/income target AND 15% ROE. Earnings grow 20%+ from current levels. The stock re-rates to P/E 18x. Probability: Medium. The cost-cutting trend is real but 39% would be exceptional for any bank. Skepticism is warranted.

Scenario 3: A strategic acquirer bids for Cembra at a premium. Probability: Low. Swiss banking M&A is rare. No obvious buyer exists.

Scenario 4: The stock falls 30%+ in a market correction, creating an entry point at CHF 65-70 where the dividend yield exceeds 6% and the P/E drops to 11-12x. Probability: Medium. This is the scenario to wait for.

The Patient Investor's Path

Cembra is not a bad business. It is a good business at a full price. The dividend yield of 4.4% provides reasonable income, and the extraordinary dividend in 2025 was a pleasant bonus. But income alone does not compensate for the risk of paying 24% above intrinsic value.

The patient investor's path is clear: add CMBN to the watchlist at CHF 96. Set alerts at CHF 75 and CHF 65. Wait for the next wobble -- a credit cycle scare, a regulatory tightening, a broader market correction. Switzerland will still be stable. Cembra will still be well-managed. And the stock will be cheaper.

The worst investment mistakes are not buying bad companies. They are buying good companies at bad prices. Cembra at CHF 96 is not a bad company. It is a fair company at a fair-to-full price. And "fair" is not good enough when the margin of safety is zero.

Wait for the pitch. It will come.

Executive Summary

Cembra Money Bank is Switzerland's leading specialist consumer finance bank, offering personal loans, auto leasing, credit cards, and BNPL products. The company was formerly GE Capital's Swiss consumer finance unit and has been publicly listed since its November 2013 IPO. With ROE around 13.7%, operating margins near 48%, net margins of 33%, and a 13-year unbroken dividend growth record, Cembra is a well-run, predictable business operating in a highly regulated Swiss market. However, the stock has rallied ~70% from its 2023 lows and now trades at P/E 15.8x and P/B 2.1x -- reasonable but offering limited margin of safety. The narrow moat is real but not exceptional, and structural headwinds from Swiss interest rate caps, personal loan shrinkage, and the loss of the Migros partnership limit upside.

Verdict: Quality B+ Swiss consumer finance business at fair value. WAIT for a pullback to CHF 75-80 (P/E ~12-13x, ~4.5-5% yield) for meaningful margin of safety.


Phase 0: Opportunity Identification (Klarman)

Why Does This Opportunity Exist?

1. Neglect / Limited Coverage: Cembra is a mid-cap Swiss stock (CHF 2.8B) with limited international analyst coverage. It trades only on the SIX Swiss Exchange and is not easily accessible to US/UK investors. AlphaVantage and EODHD APIs have zero coverage -- this stock is genuinely under-followed outside Switzerland.

2. Post-Migros Recovery Fully Priced: The stock cratered 37% in 2021 when Migros terminated its Cumulus Mastercard partnership (announced August 2021, effective June 2022). This was Cembra's largest credit card partnership. The company launched its own "Certo!" card family and has recovered financially -- but the stock has already rallied 70%+ from the 2023 lows. The recovery is priced in.

3. Swiss Market Premium: Swiss financial stocks command valuation premiums due to the country's stability, strong currency, and robust regulatory environment. This is partly warranted but limits upside.

At current prices (CHF 96.45), the opportunity is limited. The stock is at fair value. No catalyst-driven mispricing exists.


Phase 1: Risk Analysis (Inversion)

"What Would Destroy This Investment?"

1. INTEREST RATE CAP COMPRESSION

Probability: HIGH | Impact: MEDIUM-HIGH

Swiss consumer credit is subject to statutory maximum interest rates set by the Federal Department of Justice and Police. The current cap is 10% APR for cash loans and 12% for overdrafts/credit cards (as of Jan 1, 2026). This cap is calculated as SARON + 10 percentage points for cash loans.

With the SNB having cut rates by 175 basis points since March 2024 (policy rate now at 0.00%), the regulatory formula will mechanically lower the maximum APR further. If SARON goes negative, the ceiling drops below 10%. Cembra's net interest margin of 5.5% could compress to 4.5-5.0%, directly impacting profitability.

Already visible: Net revenues declined 2% in FY2025 (CHF 542M vs CHF 551M in FY2024) driven by lower interest income following maximum rate reductions. Net interest income fell 2% to CHF 372M.

Kill Zone: If the SNB implements negative rates again and the cap falls to 8-9%, Cembra's entire business model -- earning ~5.5% NIM on CHF 6.6B of receivables -- faces structural margin compression.

2. PERSONAL LOAN PORTFOLIO SHRINKAGE

Probability: MEDIUM-HIGH | Impact: MEDIUM

Personal loans (CHF 2.15B, 33% of receivables) declined 6% in FY2025. This is not a one-year blip. Swiss consumer credit demand is structurally challenged by:

  • Low unemployment (2.3%) reducing distress borrowing
  • Conservative Swiss culture regarding consumer debt
  • Low interest rate environment encouraging bank alternatives
  • Digital challengers offering competitive rates

If personal loans continue declining 3-5% annually, Cembra must replace this revenue with auto leasing or cards -- segments with different risk profiles.

3. CREDIT CYCLE DETERIORATION

Probability: MEDIUM | Impact: HIGH

Cembra's loss rate has been remarkably stable at 1.0-1.1% for years. But this is partly a function of the benign Swiss economic environment. In a severe recession:

  • Loss rates could spike to 2-3%+
  • Auto values would decline (collateral impairment)
  • Personal loan defaults would surge
  • Provision charges would consume a large portion of net income

With CHF 6.6B in receivables, even a 1 percentage point increase in losses wipes out CHF 66M in pre-tax income -- roughly 30% of current net income.

4. REGULATORY TIGHTENING

Probability: MEDIUM | Impact: MEDIUM

Beyond interest rate caps, Swiss regulators could:

  • Tighten creditworthiness assessments (reduce addressable market)
  • Impose additional capital requirements on consumer lenders
  • Restrict auto leasing terms
  • Regulate BNPL products more aggressively

FINMA and the Swiss Consumer Credit Act already impose strict requirements. Further tightening would raise compliance costs and shrink the addressable market.

5. DIGITAL DISRUPTION

Probability: LOW-MEDIUM | Impact: MEDIUM

Fintech lenders (Neon, Revolut, N26) and big-bank digital offerings could erode Cembra's position in:

  • Credit cards (competition from Swisscard AECS, bank-issued cards)
  • Personal loans (online comparison platforms drive rate competition)
  • BNPL (Klarna, Afterpay entering Swiss market)

Cembra's BNPL portfolio already shrank 17% in FY2025 to CHF 131M -- a warning sign that digital-native competitors may be winning this segment.

Inversion Section

How could this lose 50%+ permanently? Swiss financial crisis + regulatory cap squeeze + loss rate spike to 3%+. At CHF 48, the stock would trade at 0.9x book value and 8x depressed earnings. This would require a severe recession or Swiss property crash -- unlikely but not impossible.

What would make me sell immediately (non-price triggers)?

  • Loss rate exceeding 2.0% for two consecutive quarters
  • ROE falling below 10% sustainably
  • Management pursuing aggressive growth outside Switzerland
  • Tier 1 capital ratio dropping below 14%

3-sentence bear case: Cembra is a low-growth consumer lender in a country where interest rate caps mechanically compress margins as rates fall. Personal loans -- the highest-margin product -- are structurally shrinking. At P/E 16x with 2-3% EPS growth, the stock offers a ~10% total return (4.4% yield + ~5% growth) that barely compensates for banking sector risks.


Phase 2: Financial Analysis

Return Metrics

ROE Trend:

Year ROE Comment
2019 15.7% Pre-Migros loss, peak ROE
2020 13.8% COVID impact
2021 13.9% Record net income CHF 161.5M
2022 13.7% Migros exit, Certo! launch
2023 12.5% Trough
2024 13.4% Recovery
2025 13.7% Cost efficiency gains
2026E ~15% Management target

ROE averaging 13.5% over 5 years. This fails Buffett's >15% ROE test, though it approaches the target. For a Swiss bank with conservative risk management, 13-14% ROE is respectable but not exceptional.

DuPont Decomposition (FY2025):

  • Net Margin: 33.1% (CHF 180M / CHF 542M)
  • Asset Turnover: 0.068x (CHF 542M / CHF 7,943M)
  • Equity Multiplier: 5.9x (CHF 7,943M / CHF 1,345M)

ROE = 33.1% x 0.068 x 5.9 = 13.3% (approximately matches reported 13.7%)

The high net margin is offset by extremely low asset turnover (characteristic of banks) and moderate leverage.

Owner Earnings Calculation: For banks, owner earnings ~ net income - required capital retention for growth.

Owner Earnings = Net Income - Growth Capital Needs = CHF 180M - (~CHF 60M retained for capital adequacy) = ~CHF 120M

Owner Earnings per share = CHF 120M / 29.3M shares = CHF 4.10/share

Valuation

Graham Number:

Graham Number = sqrt(22.5 x EPS x BVPS)
= sqrt(22.5 x 6.13 x 45.92)
= sqrt(6,331)
= CHF 79.57

Current price CHF 96.45 is 21% above the Graham Number. No Graham margin of safety.

Earnings Power Value (Conservative):

  • Normalized EPS: CHF 5.80 (average of 2021-2025)
  • Conservative multiple for Swiss consumer bank: 12-14x
  • EPV Low: CHF 5.80 x 12 = CHF 69.60
  • EPV Mid: CHF 5.80 x 13 = CHF 75.40
  • EPV High: CHF 5.80 x 14 = CHF 81.20

DCF (Conservative): Assumptions:

  • Starting owner earnings: CHF 120M
  • Growth: 3% for years 1-5, 2% terminal
  • Discount rate: 9% (Swiss equity risk premium)
DCF Value = Σ [120M x (1.03)^n / (1.09)^n] + Terminal Value / (1.09)^5
Year 1-5 PV: ~CHF 476M
Terminal Value PV: ~CHF 1,240M
Total: ~CHF 1,716M
Per share: CHF 58.56

This is very conservative -- applying a discount rate of 9% to a Swiss bank is harsh. At 7.5% discount rate:

Year 1-5 PV: ~CHF 495M
Terminal Value PV: ~CHF 1,618M
Total: ~CHF 2,113M
Per share: CHF 72.08

Private Market Value: A strategic acquirer (e.g., UBS, Zurich Cantonal Bank, or a European consumer finance group) would likely pay:

  • 1.5-2.0x book value (book = CHF 45.92)
  • Private market value: CHF 69-92 per share
  • At current price of CHF 96.45, the stock trades ABOVE the likely private market value

Relative Valuation:

Metric CMBN European Consumer Finance Peers
P/E 15.8x 10-14x
P/B 2.1x 0.8-1.5x
ROE 13.7% 10-15%
Dividend Yield 4.4% 4-6%

Cembra trades at a premium to European consumer finance peers, justified partly by Swiss stability but still leaving limited upside.

Margin of Safety Summary

Method Value/Share vs Current (CHF 96.45) MOS
Graham Number CHF 79.57 -17.5% NEGATIVE
EPV Conservative CHF 75.40 -21.8% NEGATIVE
DCF (9% DR) CHF 58.56 -39.3% NEGATIVE
DCF (7.5% DR) CHF 72.08 -25.3% NEGATIVE
Private Market CHF 69-92 -4.6% to -28.4% NEGATIVE to MINIMAL

Current price offers NO margin of safety by any valuation methodology.


Phase 3: Moat Analysis

Moat Sources

1. Regulatory Barriers to Entry (NARROW MOAT)

Swiss banking regulation creates a meaningful barrier to entry:

  • Banking license requirement from FINMA
  • Capital adequacy requirements (17.6% Tier 1)
  • Swiss Consumer Credit Act compliance
  • Strict creditworthiness assessment rules
  • AML/KYC requirements

Foreign fintechs cannot easily enter the Swiss consumer credit market without a banking license or partnership with a licensed institution. This protects incumbents.

However: Swiss universal banks (UBS, cantonal banks) already operate in this space and could expand if they chose to. The regulatory moat protects against foreign entrants, not domestic competition.

2. Distribution Network (NARROW MOAT)

  • ~4,000 car dealer partnerships for auto financing
  • 13 branches + online presence
  • Credit card partnerships (IKEA Family, Certo! card family)
  • Established savings deposit base (CHF 3.6B)

This distribution network took decades to build and would be expensive to replicate. But it's not irreplaceable -- a well-capitalized competitor could build similar relationships within 3-5 years.

3. Data & Underwriting Expertise (NARROW MOAT)

20+ years of Swiss consumer credit data (originally from GE Capital era since 1998). This enables:

  • Superior credit scoring models
  • Tight loss performance (1.0-1.1% loss rate)
  • Efficient risk-based pricing

4. Switching Costs (MINIMAL)

Consumer loans have low switching costs. Borrowers can refinance at maturity. Credit card switching is moderate (behavioral inertia) but the Migros exit proved that partnership-based card portfolios can evaporate quickly.

Moat Durability Assessment

Threat Severity (1-5) Timeline Company Mitigation
Fintech disruption 3 3-5 years Digital investment, Certo! launch
Interest rate cap compression 4 1-3 years Cost efficiency (39% C/I target), pricing
Universal bank competition 2 Ongoing Specialist focus, speed, dealer network
Economic downturn 3 Cyclical Conservative underwriting, 17.6% Tier 1
Regulatory tightening 3 Ongoing Compliance infrastructure, lobbying

Moat Width: NARROW Moat Trend: STABLE (not widening, not narrowing) 10-Year Trajectory: Same width -- regulatory protection persists but competitive pressures also persist.


Phase 4: Management & Capital Allocation

Management Team

CEO: Holger Laubenthal

  • Leading strategic transformation focused on cost efficiency
  • Targeting 39% cost/income ratio (from 45.2% in FY2025)
  • ROE target of ~15%
  • New strategic cycle to be unveiled Q4 2026

Capital Allocation Track Record

Use of Capital Assessment
Dividends EXCELLENT - 13 consecutive years of increasing ordinary dividends (CHF 2.85 in 2013 to CHF 4.60 in 2025). CHF 1.00 extraordinary dividend in 2025. Payout ratio ~69%.
Share Buybacks MINIMAL - Shares outstanding essentially flat at 29.3M since IPO. No material buyback program.
Organic Growth ADEQUATE - Net financing receivables stable at CHF 6.6B. Growth in auto leasing (+3%) offset by personal loan decline (-6%).
M&A DISCIPLINED - No material acquisitions. Organic growth focus.
Cost Reduction STRONG - Cost/income ratio improved from 50.9% (2023) to 45.2% (2025). Targeting 39%.

Management demonstrates disciplined, shareholder-friendly capital allocation. The progressive dividend policy with a floor at the prior year's level provides downside protection for income investors. The extraordinary dividend in 2025 signals confidence in excess capital position.

Insider Ownership

Limited public data on insider ownership. Swiss corporate governance typically features lower insider ownership than US companies. The company does not appear to have a controlling shareholder.


Phase 5: Catalyst Analysis

Positive Catalysts

Catalyst Timeline Probability Impact
Cost/income ratio reaching 39% target 2026-2027 50% +5-10% EPS uplift
ROE reaching 15% target 2026-2027 40% Re-rating to P/E 16-18x
SNB rate stabilization/increase 2026-2027 30% Removes NIM compression fear
New strategic cycle (Q4 2026) Q4 2026 80% Could include M&A, new products
Auto leasing growth acceleration 2026+ 50% Replaces personal loan decline

Negative Catalysts

Catalyst Timeline Probability Impact
Further SNB rate cuts (negative rates) 2026 20% -5-10% NIM compression
Interest rate cap reduction below 10% 2026+ 30% Structural margin squeeze
Credit cycle deterioration Uncertain 20% Loss rate spike = major EPS hit
Swiss economic slowdown 2026+ 25% Lower loan demand + higher losses

Net Assessment: No strong near-term catalyst for upside. The stock has already rallied on the recovery story. Further upside requires execution on the 39% cost/income target and ROE improvement toward 15%.


Phase 6: Decision Synthesis

Intrinsic Value Estimate

Weighting the valuation methodologies:

Method Value Weight Weighted
Graham Number CHF 79.57 15% CHF 11.94
EPV (13x normalized) CHF 75.40 25% CHF 18.85
DCF (7.5% DR) CHF 72.08 20% CHF 14.42
Private Market (midpoint) CHF 80.50 20% CHF 16.10
Dividend Discount (10x owner earnings) CHF 82.00 20% CHF 16.40

Weighted Intrinsic Value: ~CHF 78 per share

At current price of CHF 96.45, the stock is ~24% overvalued relative to intrinsic value.

Price Targets

Strong Buy:       CHF 55   (P/E ~9x, P/B 1.2x, Yield 8.4%)
Accumulate:       CHF 70   (P/E ~11.4x, P/B 1.5x, Yield 6.6%)
Fair Value:       CHF 78   (P/E ~12.7x, P/B 1.7x, Yield 5.9%)
Current:          CHF 96.45 (P/E 15.8x, P/B 2.1x, Yield 4.4%)
Take Profits:     CHF 94   (P/E ~15.3x)
Sell:             CHF 117  (P/E ~19x, P/B 2.5x)

Expected Return

Scenario Probability Return (3yr) Weighted
Bull (15% ROE, P/E 18x) 20% +35% +7.0%
Base (13.5% ROE, P/E 15x) 45% +5% (dividends only) +2.3%
Bear (loss rate spike, P/E 11x) 25% -25% -6.3%
Disaster (Swiss recession, P/E 8x) 10% -45% -4.5%
Expected 100% -1.5%

Total expected return is slightly negative -- confirming the stock is at or above fair value.

Recommendation

+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|                 INVESTMENT RECOMMENDATION                       |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| Company: Cembra Money Bank AG    Ticker: CMBN.SW               |
| Current Price: CHF 96.45         Date: Feb 21, 2026            |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| RECOMMENDATION:  [x] WAIT                                      |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| STRONG BUY:        CHF 55    (30%+ MOS, P/E ~9x)              |
| ACCUMULATE:        CHF 70    (10% MOS, P/E ~11.4x)            |
| FAIR VALUE:        CHF 78    (intrinsic value)                 |
| CURRENT PRICE:     CHF 96.45 (24% above IV)                   |
| TAKE PROFITS:      CHF 94    (if owned)                        |
| SELL:              CHF 117   (50% above IV)                    |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| GAP TO ACCUMULATE: -27.4%                                       |
| DIVIDEND YIELD (CURRENT): 4.41% ordinary, 5.81% total         |
| PRIMARY RISK: Interest rate cap compression squeezing NIM      |
| SELL TRIGGER: Loss rate >2.0%, ROE <10%, Tier 1 <14%          |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+

Sell Triggers (Pre-Defined)

  1. Thesis Break: Loss rate exceeds 2.0% for two consecutive quarters
  2. Moat Erosion: Personal loan portfolio declines >10% annually for 2+ years
  3. Management Failure: Pursuing aggressive acquisitions outside Switzerland
  4. Valuation: Price exceeds CHF 117 (50% above IV)

Monitoring Metrics

Metric Current Alert Threshold Action
Loss Rate 1.1% >1.5% Review thesis
ROE 13.7% <10% Exit
Cost/Income 45.2% >55% Review
Tier 1 Ratio 17.6% <14% Exit
Net Financing Receivables CHF 6.58B <CHF 6.0B (sustained decline) Review thesis

Sources

Primary Documents

Document Source Data Extracted
Annual Reports 2019-2024 cembra.ch/investor Financial KPIs, segment data, strategy
FY2025 Results Press Release Finanzwire Latest financials, guidance
Dividend History cembra.ch/investor 13-year dividend record

Web Sources

Source URL Data Extracted
StockAnalysis stockanalysis.com/quote/swx/CMBN Income statement, balance sheet, cash flow, statistics
MarketScreener marketscreener.com/CEMBRA-MONEY-BANK-AG Financial data, estimates, ratios, historical returns
CompaniesMarketCap companiesmarketcap.com/cembra-money-bank Historical annual returns, all-time high/low
Cembra IR cembra.ch/en/investor Annual reports, dividends, share data
Loyens & Loeff loyensloeff.com Swiss maximum interest rate regulation
Borel Barbey borel-barbey.ch New interest rate caps analysis
Finanzwire finanzwire.com FY2025 results details