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EL

Estee Lauder

$107.47 38B market cap 2024-12-24
Estee Lauder Companies EL BUFFETT / MUNGER / KLARMAN SUMMARY
1 SNAPSHOT
Price$107.47
Market Cap38B
2 BUSINESS

Unprofitable company at bubble valuation. Negative EPS (-$2.59), negative ROE (-20.7%), trading at 55x forward P/E. Classic value trap. Avoid until profitability returns.

3 MOAT NARROW

Eroding brand power, weakening distribution moat. Premium positioning under attack. Department store and travel retail channels in structural decline.

4 MANAGEMENT
CEO: Stephane de La Faverie

Dividend cut 47%. CEO and CFO both retiring simultaneously. Company in PRGP restructuring targeting $1.1-1.4B savings. Capital allocation impaired by losses.

5 ECONOMICS
7% Op Margin
7% ROIC
7% ROE
44.4x P/E
0.67B FCF
50% Debt/EBITDA
6 VALUATION
FCF Yield1.8%
DCF Range50 - 65

Overvalued

7 MUNGER INVERSION
Kill Event Severity P() E[Loss]
China prestige beauty secular decline HIGH - -
New CEO resets expectations MED - -
8 KLARMAN LENS
Downside Case

China prestige beauty secular decline

Why Market Right

Company is already losing $1; 1B annually

Catalysts

None visible; Management withdrew guidance due to inability to forecast China recovery; New CEO may provide clarity in 2025, but likely to reset expectations lower

9 VERDICT REJECT
D Quality Moderate - ~4.8x
Strong Buy$40
Buy$30
Fair Value$65

Monitor, Accumulate below 30

10 MACRO RESILIENCE -28
Strong Headwinds Required MoS: 32%
Monetary
-2
Geopolitical
-6
Technology
-2
Demographic
-8
Climate
0
Regulatory
-2
Governance
-4
Market
-4
Key Exposures
  • China Structural Decline -12 China prestige beauty down mid-teens with no visibility on recovery. Management withdrew guidance. Local brands gaining share permanently.
  • Generational Brand Shift -12 Gen Z prefers indie, clean, K-beauty. The aspirational ladder that built Estee Lauder has collapsed with younger consumers.
  • Leadership Vacuum -4 CEO Fabrizio Freda and CFO Tracey Travis both retiring. New CEO starts Jan 2025 with no visibility. Guidance withdrawn.

Estee Lauder faces severe macro headwinds with multiple critical red flags triggered. The -28 total score places it firmly in "Strong Headwinds" territory. China structural decline (-12) and Gen Z brand shift (-12) are both critical-level threats. The company is currently LOSING MONEY (negative EPS, negative ROE) while trading at 55x forward earnings - the market prices hope, not reality. Leadership vacuum adds execution risk. Even at the required 32% margin of safety, current price of $107 implies fair value of $158 - absurd for a money-losing business. This is an automatic REJECT regardless of macrotrend analysis. No price justifies ownership until profitability returns.

🧠 ULTRATHINK Deep Philosophical Analysis

EL - Ultrathink Analysis

The Real Question

We're not asking "are prestige beauty brands valuable?" The century of La Mer, Clinique, and Estee Lauder brand equity answer that. The real question is: When a company is losing $1 billion annually while trading at 55x forward earnings, is the market pricing in recovery or just refusing to price in reality?

The market sees Estee Lauder as either fallen aristocracy or value trap. Neither frame is quite right. The deeper question: When your CEO, CFO, and pricing power all depart simultaneously, when your core market structurally changes, when management withdraws guidance because they can't forecastβ€”is this a turnaround opportunity or a case study in permanent impairment?

Hidden Assumptions

Assumption 1: China prestige beauty will recover. China was the growth engine. Now it's the wound. Mid-teens decline, no visibility on recovery, management admitting they cannot forecast. The assumption is that Chinese consumers will return to prestige beauty spending. But what if the trade-down is structural? What if local Korean and Chinese brands have permanently captured loyalty? The assumption that China rebounds ignores that consumer preferences don't un-change.

Assumption 2: Travel retail is a cycle, not a structural shift. Hainan down 40%. Asian travel retail in sustained decline. The assumption is that post-pandemic travel patterns will revert. But examine the behavior: Chinese tourists shopping at Korean and Chinese beauty counters instead. Conversion rates "far below pre-pandemic." The assumption that travel retail recovers ignores that the destination of spending has shifted.

Assumption 3: Brand equity survives the transition. La Mer and Clinique built loyalty over decades. The assumption is this loyalty persists through turmoil. But Gen Z doesn't have their mothers' brand loyalties. Indie brands, clean beauty, K-beautyβ€”the competitive set has exploded. The assumption that brand equity is permanent ignores that every brand was once irreplaceable until it wasn't.

Assumption 4: 55x forward P/E makes sense for a loss-making company. The market pays 55x forward earnings for a company currently losing over $1 billion annually. The assumption is that normalized earnings will arrive on schedule. But who provides that schedule? Not managementβ€”they withdrew guidance. The assumption that forward earnings materialize ignores that "forward" is someone's hope, not management's projection.

The Contrarian View

For the bulls to be right, we need to believe:

  1. China rebounds stronger than before β€” Not just stabilizes, but returns to growth. Prestige beauty regains its aspirational status among Chinese consumers.

  2. New CEO executes flawlessly β€” Stephane de La Faverie, starting January 2025, must navigate structural headwinds while cutting costs without damaging brands.

  3. Travel retail finds new equilibrium β€” Either Hainan recovers or alternative channels emerge to replace lost volume.

  4. Cost restructuring works without brand damage β€” PRGP saves $1.1-1.4B without cutting the marketing and R&D that built the brands.

The probability of full China recovery? Perhaps 15%. Travel retail stabilization? 25%. Successful turnaround execution? 30%. Each must occur for the investment to work at current prices.

Simplest Thesis

Estee Lauder owns some of the world's most valuable beauty brandsβ€”and is currently losing $1 billion annually while trading at 55x forward earnings that management can't forecast.

Why This Opportunity Exists

The opportunity doesn't exist. This is a trap.

At $107, Estee Lauder is priced for a recovery that management cannot see:

  1. Not forced selling β€” The stock has fallen 65% from highs, but is still held by believers.

  2. Not complexity β€” The problem is simple: revenue falling, profits gone, China structural.

  3. Not neglect β€” 15 analysts cover it; they just don't know what to say.

  4. Not temporary β€” Management explicitly admitted they cannot forecast recovery timing.

The market sees hope. The financials show despair. At $107, you're paying for hope.

The opportunity might exist at $30-40, where the brands are valued as impaired assets rather than recovering growth engines.

What Would Change My Mind

  1. Stock drops 60%+ to $40 or below β€” At that level, you're buying brands at distressed prices. Worth considering even with continued losses.

  2. Two quarters of positive EPS β€” If profitability returns, the thesis can be re-evaluated from a foundation of reality.

  3. China shows visible recovery β€” Not management hope, but actual data: revenue growth, improving sell-through, regained market share.

  4. New CEO provides credible turnaround plan β€” Specific targets, specific timelines, specific accountability.

  5. Dividend maintained and covered by FCF β€” If the reduced dividend is sustainable, cash flow provides some floor.

None is present today. The correct action is complete avoidance until fundamentals improve.

The Soul of This Business

Strip away the losses, the China exposure, the departed executives. What is Estee Lauder at its core?

Estee Lauder is aspiration bottled. For decades, the company sold not just skincare and makeup, but the promise of luxury accessible. La Mer whispered that you could have what celebrities have. Clinique promised dermatologist-approved science. MAC made artistry democratic.

The soul is the aspirational ladderβ€”products positioned just out of easy reach, making the purchase feel like an achievement. This psychology built the company.

But here's the uncomfortable truth: the aspirational ladder has collapsed. Chinese consumers no longer climb toward Western prestige. Gen Z doesn't aspire the way their mothers did. Korean beauty offers quality at lower prices. Indie brands offer authenticity that legacy brands can't manufacture.

At $30, you buy the brands at liquidation prices, betting some aspirational value survives.

At $107, you buy the brands at premium prices while pretending the aspirational model still works.

The formulas remain in the labs. The brand names remain on the products. The question is whether anyone still aspires to them.

The brands are worth something. The current price assumes they're worth everything they ever were.

The ladder is broken. The price pretends it isn't.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Metric Value Assessment
Verdict REJECT 2.5/10
Current Price $107.47
EPS (TTM) -$2.59 FAILING - Losing Money
ROE -20.7% FAILING - Destroying Value
Forward P/E 54.95 Absurdly Expensive
Dividend $1.40 (1.3%) Cut 47%, Unsustainable
Net Income FY25 -$1.13B MASSIVE LOSS

Investment Thesis (NEGATIVE)

Estee Lauder is a once-great prestige beauty company in severe distress. The company is currently unprofitable, with negative EPS and ROE, while trading at absurd valuations (55x forward earnings). Both the CEO and CFO are retiring simultaneously, FY25 guidance has been withdrawn due to "inability to forecast China recovery," and the dividend was slashed 47%. This is a classic falling knife situation with no clear catalyst for recovery.

This is an automatic REJECT under Buffett criteria:

  • Negative ROE (-20.7%) fails the 15% minimum test catastrophically
  • Company is losing over $1 billion annually
  • No margin of safety at current prices
  • Leadership vacuum with dual executive departures
  • Structural China exposure with no visibility on recovery

PHASE 0: OPPORTUNITY IDENTIFICATION (Klarman)

Why Might This Appear Cheap?

Factor Assessment
Stock down from highs Down ~65% from $370 (2021) to $107
Well-known brand Premium brands: La Mer, Clinique, MAC
Historically profitable Generated $2.9B net income in FY2021
Restructuring underway PRGP plan targeting $1.1-1.4B savings

Why the Opportunity is FALSE

This is NOT a value opportunity. It's a value trap.

  1. Price decline reflects fundamental deterioration, not temporary mispricing
  2. Forward P/E of 55x means market ALREADY expects recovery - this is not "cheap"
  3. Structural problems in China/Travel Retail are secular, not cyclical
  4. Management has zero visibility - they withdrew guidance
  5. No margin of safety - at $107, stock prices in massive turnaround

Klarman Test: FAIL - Cannot explain why this is genuinely cheap when it trades at 55x earnings


PHASE 1: RISK ANALYSIS (Inversion)

"All I want to know is where I'm going to die, so I'll never go there." - Munger

The Bear Case (Three Sentences)

If I were short this stock, my thesis would be: "Estee Lauder's core markets (China prestige beauty, Asian travel retail) are in structural decline with no visibility on recovery. The company is burning over $1B annually while still paying dividends and trading at 55x forward earnings - the market is pricing in a turnaround that management can't even forecast. When the new CEO arrives and resets expectations further, this stock will trade at half current levels."

Top 5 Ways This Investment Could Lose 50%+ Permanently

Risk Probability Impact Expected Loss
1. China prestige beauty secular decline 40% -60% -24%
2. New CEO announces deeper restructuring 50% -40% -20%
3. Dividend eliminated entirely 30% -30% -9%
4. Further inventory destocking in travel retail 60% -25% -15%
5. L'Oreal takes market share during transition 35% -35% -12%

Risk Deep Dive

1. China Structural Decline (CRITICAL)

  • Evidence: China prestige beauty down mid-teens % (FY25 Q1 transcript)
  • Evidence: Management has "no visibility" on recovery timing
  • Evidence: Consumer confidence at multi-year lows post-COVID
  • Impact: China represents 25-30% of company value historically
  • Assessment: This is NOT cyclical. Chinese consumers are trading down permanently.

2. Leadership Vacuum (CRITICAL)

  • Evidence: CEO Fabrizio Freda retiring after 16 years
  • Evidence: CFO Tracey Travis retiring simultaneously
  • Evidence: New CEO Stephane de La Faverie starts Jan 2025
  • Impact: Strategy reset likely, potential further guidance cuts
  • Assessment: New CEO will likely kitchen-sink results to reset expectations

3. Travel Retail Implosion (CRITICAL)

  • Evidence: Hainan travel retail down 40%+ (FY24 Q4 transcript)
  • Evidence: Conversion rates "far below pre-pandemic levels"
  • Evidence: 7 consecutive quarters of decline before Q3 FY24
  • Impact: Travel retail was major growth engine (15-20% of sales)
  • Assessment: Structural change in Chinese travel patterns

4. Financial Deterioration

  • FY21 to FY25 Trend:
    • Revenue: $16.2B β†’ $14.3B (-12%)
    • Net Income: $2.87B β†’ -$1.13B (-139%)
    • Equity: $6.06B β†’ $3.87B (-36%)
    • Current Ratio: 1.84x β†’ 1.30x (-29%)

5. Valuation Insanity

  • Forward P/E: 54.95x - pricing in earnings recovery that management can't forecast
  • P/B: 10.07x - paying 10x book for a money-losing company
  • EV/EBITDA: 110x - bubble-level valuation

Immediate Disqualifiers (Munger Anti-Checklist)

Criterion Status Notes
Outside circle of competence PASS Prestige beauty is understandable
Heavily promoted by Wall Street FAIL 15 Hold ratings, classic "hope" stock
Requires macro forecast to work FAIL Requires China recovery forecast
Management with questionable character PASS No ethics concerns
Complex capital structure PASS Simple structure
Dependent on single market FAIL Highly dependent on China/Asia
Requires technology prediction PASS Not tech-dependent
Looking because price dropped FAIL Classic falling knife psychology
Everyone I respect owns it PASS Not a crowded trade
Story more compelling than numbers FAIL "Premium brands" story vs -$2.59 EPS

DISQUALIFIED: 5 of 10 anti-checklist items triggered


PHASE 2: FINANCIAL ANALYSIS

Buffett's Primary Test: ROE

Fiscal Year ROE Buffett 15% Test
FY2021 47.4% PASS
FY2022 42.8% PASS
FY2023 18.1% PASS
FY2024 7.3% FAIL
FY2025 -29.2% CATASTROPHIC FAIL

Buffett would not touch this stock. The trend is catastrophic: from 47% ROE to negative 29% in four years.

Income Statement Deterioration

Metric FY2021 FY2022 FY2023 FY2024 FY2025 4-Yr Change
Revenue $16.2B $17.7B $15.9B $15.6B $14.3B -12%
Gross Profit $12.4B $13.4B $11.4B $11.2B $10.6B -15%
Operating Income $2.6B $3.2B $1.5B $1.0B $1.0B -62%
Net Income $2.87B $2.39B $1.01B $0.39B -$1.13B -139%

Balance Sheet Erosion

Metric FY2021 FY2025 Change
Total Equity $6.06B $3.87B -36%
Total Debt $5.95B $7.72B +30%
Net Debt $0.99B $4.80B +385%
Current Ratio 1.84x 1.30x -29%
Debt/Equity 0.98x 2.00x +104%

Red Flag: Equity shrinking while debt growing = Financial distress pattern

Cash Flow Reality Check

Metric FY2021 FY2022 FY2023 FY2024 FY2025
Operating CF $3.63B $3.04B $1.73B $2.36B $1.27B
CapEx $0.64B $1.04B $3.29B $0.92B $0.60B
Free Cash Flow $2.99B $2.00B -$1.56B $1.44B $0.67B
Dividends Paid $0.75B $0.84B $0.93B $0.95B $0.62B
FCF After Div $2.24B $1.16B -$2.49B $0.49B $0.05B

Critical Issue: Company is barely covering reduced dividend from FCF ($0.67B FCF vs $0.62B dividends)

Valuation Analysis

Graham Number

Cannot calculate - negative EPS makes Graham Number undefined.

Graham Number = √(22.5 Γ— EPS Γ— BVPS)
Graham Number = √(22.5 Γ— (-2.59) Γ— 15.74)
Graham Number = √(-918) = UNDEFINED (negative earnings)

Graham would not invest in a company with negative earnings.

Liquidation Value

Asset Book Value Liquidation Value (Est.)
Cash $2.92B $2.92B (100%)
Receivables ~$1.8B $1.44B (80%)
Inventory $2.07B $1.04B (50%)
PPE ~$3.5B $1.75B (50%)
Goodwill $2.13B $0 (0%)
Intangibles $3.76B $0.75B (20%)
Total Assets ~$19.9B ~$7.9B
Less: Liabilities -$16.0B
Liquidation Value -$8.1B

NEGATIVE LIQUIDATION VALUE - In bankruptcy, shareholders get nothing.

DCF Valuation (If Recovery Occurs)

Bull Case Assumptions:

  • Revenue recovers to $17B by FY2028
  • Operating margin recovers to 15%
  • Tax rate: 28%
  • Discount rate: 10%
Year Revenue Op. Income NOPAT Present Value
FY26 $14.5B $1.02B $0.73B $0.67B
FY27 $15.5B $1.55B $1.12B $0.92B
FY28 $16.5B $1.98B $1.43B $1.07B
FY29 $17.0B $2.38B $1.71B $1.17B
FY30 $17.5B $2.63B $1.89B $1.18B
Terminal $15.7B
Enterprise Value $20.7B
Less: Net Debt -$4.8B
Equity Value $15.9B
Per Share $65

Even in a BULL CASE recovery scenario, fair value is $65 - current price is $107.

Current price implies:

  • 65% OVERVALUED to bull case DCF
  • ZERO margin of safety
  • Market pricing in better-than-bull-case recovery

Valuation Summary

Method Value vs $107.47
Graham Number N/A Cannot invest
Liquidation Value Negative Equity worthless
DCF Bull Case $65 65% overvalued
10x Normalized Earnings $40* 169% overvalued
Private Market Value $50-70** 53-115% overvalued

*Assuming $1.00 normalized EPS (optimistic) **Based on L'Oreal takeout at 2x sales = $28.6B EV = $97/share minus control premium


PHASE 3: MOAT ANALYSIS

Historical Moat Sources

Moat Source Strength (Historical) Current Status
Brand Portfolio Strong ERODING
Prestige Positioning Strong UNDER ATTACK
Global Distribution Strong SHRINKING
Customer Loyalty Moderate WEAKENING

Moat Erosion Evidence

1. Brand Power Diminishing

  • The Ordinary (budget brand) is fastest-growing at 20%
  • Clinique, Estee Lauder core brands losing share
  • Chinese consumers trading down to local brands
  • Gen Z prefers indie/clean beauty brands

2. Distribution Moat Narrowing

  • Department store channel in secular decline
  • Travel retail collapsing (down 40% in Hainan)
  • Forced to expand to Amazon (admits retail weakness)
  • TikTok Shop entry signals desperation

3. Competitive Position Weakening

  • L'Oreal gaining share in every major category
  • Korean beauty brands (K-beauty) taking Asia
  • Indie brands winning with younger consumers
  • Private label improving quality at lower price

Moat Durability Assessment

Force of Erosion Severity (1-5) Timeline Company Response
Chinese consumer trade-down 5 Ongoing None effective
Travel retail structural decline 4 2-3 years Reduce exposure
Gen Z preference shift 4 5-10 years Acquired The Ordinary
L'Oreal competitive pressure 4 Ongoing Losing share
Channel disruption (DTC, TikTok) 3 3-5 years Late entrant

Key Question: "Will this moat be wider or narrower in 10 years?"

ANSWER: SIGNIFICANTLY NARROWER

  • Chinese market may never return to prior trajectory
  • Travel retail is structurally impaired
  • Next generation prefers different brands
  • L'Oreal has superior execution and balance sheet

Moat Score: 3/10 - Once-strong moat in terminal decline


PHASE 4: DECISION SYNTHESIS

Graham's 7 Criteria Assessment

# Criterion Test EL Pass?
1 Adequate Size Sales > $100M $14.3B PASS
2 Strong Financial Condition CR > 2:1 1.30x FAIL
3 Earnings Stability 10 years positive Negative FY25 FAIL
4 Dividend Record 20+ years uninterrupted Cut 47% FAIL
5 Earnings Growth >33% over 10 years Declining FAIL
6 Moderate P/E P/E < 15 Negative/55x fwd FAIL
7 Moderate P/B P/B < 1.5 or P/EΓ—P/B < 22.5 10x FAIL

Graham Score: 1/7 - AUTOMATIC REJECT

Buffett Quality Criteria

Criterion Assessment
Explain business in one sentence? YES - Premium beauty company
ROE consistently > 15%? NO - Currently -20.7%
Management skin in game? Limited - Lauder family control
Identifiable moat? ERODING - no longer durable
Consistent free cash flow? NO - Collapsed from $3B to $0.7B

Buffett Score: 1/5 - AUTOMATIC REJECT

Scenario Analysis

Scenario Probability Price Target Weighted Return
Bull: Full Recovery 15% $120 +1.7%
Base: Slow Recovery 30% $80 -7.7%
Bear: Continued Decline 40% $50 -21.4%
Disaster: Dividend Cut Again 15% $30 -10.7%
Expected Value 100% $62 -42%

Margin of Safety Assessment

Valuation Method Fair Value Current Price Margin of Safety
DCF Bull Case $65 $107.47 -65% (NEGATIVE)
Private Market $70 $107.47 -54% (NEGATIVE)
10x Normalized EPS $40 $107.47 -169% (NEGATIVE)

There is NO margin of safety. The stock is significantly overvalued.


FINAL RECOMMENDATION

β”Œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”
β”‚                     INVESTMENT RECOMMENDATION                    β”‚
β”œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€
β”‚ Company: Estee Lauder Companies     Ticker: EL                  β”‚
β”‚ Current Price: $107.47              Date: 2024-12-24            β”‚
β”œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€
β”‚ VALUATION SUMMARY                                                β”‚
β”‚ β”Œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”¬β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”¬β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β” β”‚
β”‚ β”‚ Method                  β”‚ Value/Share β”‚ vs Current Price    β”‚ β”‚
β”‚ β”œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”Όβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”Όβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€ β”‚
β”‚ β”‚ Graham Number           β”‚ N/A         β”‚ Cannot calculate    β”‚ β”‚
β”‚ β”‚ Liquidation Value       β”‚ NEGATIVE    β”‚ Zero equity value   β”‚ β”‚
β”‚ β”‚ DCF (Conservative)      β”‚ $50         β”‚ -115% (overvalued)  β”‚ β”‚
β”‚ β”‚ DCF (Bull Case)         β”‚ $65         β”‚ -65% (overvalued)   β”‚ β”‚
β”‚ β”‚ Private Market Value    β”‚ $70         β”‚ -54% (overvalued)   β”‚ β”‚
β”‚ β”‚ 10x Normalized Earnings β”‚ $40         β”‚ -169% (overvalued)  β”‚ β”‚
β”‚ β””β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”΄β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”΄β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”˜ β”‚
β”‚                                                                  β”‚
β”‚ INTRINSIC VALUE ESTIMATE: $55-65 (optimistic)                   β”‚
β”‚ MARGIN OF SAFETY: NEGATIVE (-65% to -95%)                       β”‚
β”œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€
β”‚ RECOMMENDATION:  [X] REJECT                                      β”‚
β”œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€
β”‚ Avoid Price: > $55 (current $107 is 2x fair value)              β”‚
β”‚ Reconsider Price: < $40 (25%+ MOS to bull case)                 β”‚
β”‚ Strong Buy Price: < $30 (would require 50%+ drop)               β”‚
β”œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€
β”‚ POSITION SIZE: 0% - DO NOT BUY                                   β”‚
β”‚ CATALYST: None visible - management has no visibility           β”‚
β”‚ PRIMARY RISK: Structural China/travel retail decline            β”‚
β”‚ THESIS BREAK: Already broken - company losing money             β”‚
β””β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”˜

Why This is a REJECT (Not Just a PASS)

  1. Negative EPS - Company is currently losing money
  2. Negative ROE - Destroying shareholder value
  3. Extreme Overvaluation - 55x forward P/E for a broken business
  4. No Margin of Safety - Priced for perfect recovery
  5. Leadership Vacuum - CEO and CFO both leaving
  6. Guidance Withdrawn - Management admits no visibility
  7. Structural Decline - China and travel retail are secular, not cyclical
  8. Eroding Moat - Brand power diminishing with younger consumers
  9. Dividend Cut - 47% reduction signals further trouble
  10. Failing Graham & Buffett Tests - 1/7 Graham, 1/5 Buffett

What Would Change This View?

Condition Target Current
Stock Price < $40 $107
EPS > $2.00 positive -$2.59
ROE > 10% -20.7%
China Recovery Clear visibility "Unable to forecast"
New CEO Strategy Credible turnaround plan Starts Jan 2025

Munger's Final Test

"If this dropped 50% tomorrow, would I buy more or panic?"

Answer: PANIC - At $50, the stock would STILL be expensive relative to earnings power. A 50% drop would bring it to roughly fair value under bull case assumptions. There is no price where this becomes attractive until the company returns to profitability.


SOURCES

Document Source Data Extracted
Income Statement AlphaVantage API 5-year financials
Balance Sheet AlphaVantage API Assets, liabilities, equity
Cash Flow Statement AlphaVantage API FCF, dividends, capex
Company Overview AlphaVantage API Valuation metrics
FY25 Q1 Transcript AlphaVantage API Guidance withdrawal, China commentary
FY24 Q4 Transcript AlphaVantage API CEO/CFO retirement, strategy
FY24 Q3 Transcript AlphaVantage API "Inflection point" claim
FY24 Q2 Transcript AlphaVantage API PRGP restructuring details
Historical Prices EODHD API Price history, technical levels

VERDICT: REJECT (2.5/10)

This is not a value opportunity. It is a falling knife in a broken business trading at bubble valuations. Avoid.