KUO

$0.077 S$441M market cap February 22, 2026

International Cement Group Ltd KUO BUFFETT / MUNGER / KLARMAN SUMMARY

1 SNAPSHOT

Price$0.077

Market CapS$441M

EV~S$670M (incl. deferred EPC payables and borrowings)

Net DebtS$40M (bank borrowings less cash; S$187M deferred EPC payables additionally)

Shares5.73B

2 BUSINESS

International Cement Group is a Singapore-listed cement producer operating primarily in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. The company owns and operates four cement plants (Alacem 1.2M MT, Sharcem 1.0M MT, Korcem 1.5M MT in Kazakhstan; IMCCMC 1.2M MT in Tajikistan), one grinding station (0.6M MT, Tajikistan), and a gypsum plasterboard plant (30M sqm, Tajikistan). Total annual cement capacity is 5.5 million metric tonnes, making ICG the largest dry-process cement producer in Kazakhstan. Revenue is ~95% from cement, ~3% drywall, ~2% legacy aluminum (winding down). Revenue split: ~48% Kazakhstan, ~45% Tajikistan, ~7% other. Controlled by Chairman Ma Zhaoyang and CEO Zhang Zengtao through Victory Gate Ventures (~84% of shares).

Revenue: S$263.5M (FY2024) Organic Growth: 2.4% YoY (FY2024); 16.8% CAGR over 2020-2024

3 MOAT NONE_TO_NARROW

Limited moat based on: (1) Scale -- 5.5M MT capacity, largest dry-process producer in Kazakhstan. (2) Location proximity to demand centers (Almaty, Bishkek export corridor). (3) Vertical integration -- owns limestone mines and clinker production. Weakness: Cement is an undifferentiated commodity with no brand premium, no switching costs, and no network effects. New competitor entered Tajikistan in 2024 and immediately took market share. No pricing power demonstrated -- selling prices declined in Kazakhstan in 2024.

4 MANAGEMENT

CEO: Zhang Zengtao (since 2015)

Poor for minority shareholders. Zero dividends paid to ordinary shareholders, ever. All operating cash flow reinvested in capacity expansion or paid to NCI partners (S$16.8M in 2024). Significant related-party transactions with entities controlled by CEO's family (Xi'An Baitong Construction). Loans from controlling shareholders create conflicts. The company has invested ~S$353M in plant construction since 2017 -- ambitious but funded through shareholder dilution, deferred payments, and insider loans. Chairman Ma Zhaoyang is a Non-Executive Director of West China Cement (HK-listed), suggesting deep cement industry connections.

9 VERDICT REJECT

🧠 ULTRATHINK Deep Philosophical Analysis

International Cement Group (KUO) - Ultrathink

A deep meditation on the difference between a growing business and a good investment.

1. The Core Question: Why Does Growth Not Equal Value?

International Cement Group presents one of the most instructive case studies in value investing: a company that has done nearly everything right operationally -- and yet is a terrible investment for minority shareholders.

Consider the facts. In seven years, ICG has tripled its cement production capacity from 1.8 million to 5.5 million metric tonnes. Revenue has grown from S$114M (2018) to S$264M (2024), a compound annual growth rate of 15%. Cement sales volumes have grown from 1.2 million to 3.22 million metric tonnes. The company has built four cement plants across two countries, established itself as the largest dry-process cement producer in Kazakhstan, and is poised to benefit from infrastructure-driven demand in one of the fastest-growing regions in the world. Operating cash flow has been consistently strong: S$50-79M per year for the past five years.

By any operational measure, this is a success story. Ma Zhaoyang and Zhang Zengtao have taken a small Singapore-listed shell and transformed it into a genuine industrial enterprise in Central Asia.

And yet, over that same seven-year period, the stock has done almost nothing for public shareholders. No dividends have ever been paid. Earnings per share are wildly volatile -- ranging from 0.002 cents (2024) to 0.505 cents (2022). The net asset value per share has grown from S$0.0336 to S$0.0414, a cumulative gain of 23% over five years -- roughly 4% per annum. Compare that to simply holding an S&P 500 index fund.

The lesson is one that Buffett has articulated many times: growth in revenue and assets does not create value for shareholders unless the growth is funded at returns above the cost of capital and the resulting cash flows are returned to or reinvested on behalf of shareholders at attractive rates. At ICG, neither condition is met. Growth has been funded by debt and deferred payments (liabilities tripled from S$98M to S$325M between 2020 and 2024), and the resulting cash flows are consumed by further capital expenditure, NCI distributions, and FX losses. Nothing reaches the ordinary shareholder.

2. Moat Meditation: The Paradox of Scale Without Pricing Power

Charlie Munger would ask a simple question: "Does the company have pricing power?" The answer for ICG is unambiguously no. Cement selling prices declined in Kazakhstan in 2024 despite ICG being the largest producer. A single new entrant in Tajikistan immediately captured market share. The product is identical regardless of who produces it. Customers buy on price and logistics.

This is the fundamental paradox of the cement industry in frontier markets. Scale matters for cost efficiency -- larger kilns are more energy-efficient, and vertical integration (owning limestone mines) reduces input costs. But scale does not create pricing power because the product is a commodity. The only "moat" is transportation cost -- cement is heavy and expensive to ship, creating natural geographic monopolies within a certain radius of each plant.

ICG's plants are strategically located near Almaty, East Kazakhstan, and the Tajikistan construction belt. This proximity advantage is real but limited. It functions more like a cost advantage than a true moat. If a competitor builds a plant 100 kilometers away, ICG's advantage erodes. And competitors are building: the entry of a new producer in Tajikistan in 2024 is proof.

Buffett famously said he looks for businesses surrounded by a moat that is both wide and deep. ICG's moat is narrow and shallow. It is a position of advantage, not a position of dominance. And in a commodity business, the difference matters enormously for long-term returns.

3. The Owner's Mindset: Whose Interests Are Served?

This is where the analysis becomes uncomfortable. When Buffett talks about "owner-operators," he means managers who think and act like owners -- who align their interests with all shareholders, not just themselves.

At ICG, the ownership structure is designed to concentrate control. Ma Zhaoyang and Zhang Zengtao, through Victory Gate Ventures, control approximately 84% of outstanding shares. They make all strategic decisions. They determine capital allocation. They decide whether to pay dividends (they don't). They approve related-party transactions with entities they or their families control.

Consider the economics from their perspective. As controlling shareholders, they benefit from:

Growth in asset value (even if it doesn't flow to minorities)
Management compensation and fees
Related-party transactions with family-controlled entities
The prestige and influence of running a major industrial enterprise in Central Asia
Potential future liquidity events (sale of subsidiaries, IPO of Kazakh operations, etc.)

Now consider the economics from a minority shareholder's perspective:

No dividends
Minimal EPS growth due to FX volatility
No share buybacks
No clear catalyst for value realization
No protection against dilution or related-party extraction
Liquidity risk in a micro-cap SGX listing

This is the classic "agency problem" that Benjamin Graham warned about. The interests of controlling shareholders and minorities are not aligned. The company's operational success accrues primarily to insiders, while the risks (currency, political, liquidity) fall disproportionately on minorities.

Buffett would never buy this stock. Not because the business is bad -- the cement plants are real, the demand is real, the cash flow is real. But because the corporate structure ensures that minority shareholders are permanent passengers with no voice and no exit.

4. Risk Inversion: The Currency Time Bomb

The most revealing number in ICG's 2024 annual report is this: S$29.8 million in unrealized foreign exchange losses. This single line item -- a non-cash accounting adjustment -- wiped out the company's entire attributable profit for the year.

This is not an anomaly. It is a structural feature of the business. ICG earns revenue in Kazakhstani Tenge and Tajikistan Somoni -- currencies of oil-dependent and aid-dependent economies that are prone to sharp devaluations. But its liabilities are denominated in US Dollars and Chinese Yuan -- hard currencies that tend to appreciate against frontier market currencies over time.

This mismatch is permanent and unhedgeable. There is no liquid derivatives market for KZT or TJS hedging. The company does not disclose any hedging program. And the exposure is growing: as ICG builds more plants funded by USD/CNY-denominated EPC contracts, the liability side of the balance sheet grows in hard currency while the revenue side grows in soft currency.

In any given year, a 10-15% KZT devaluation (which happens roughly every 3-5 years) can wipe out an entire year's earnings. The 2024 result is not exceptional -- it is the baseline expectation. Investors who look at EBITDA or operating cash flow and ignore the FX risk are making a fundamental analytical error.

Munger would call this a "system with perverse incentives." Management is incentivized to grow the asset base (which increases their control and prestige) even though the financing structure ensures that growth destroys shareholder value whenever currencies move adversely.

5. Valuation Philosophy: The Trap of Cheapness

The stock traded at S$0.013 -- a fraction of net asset value -- and has since rallied to S$0.077. Investors who bought at S$0.013 have made extraordinary returns. Does this mean the stock was a great investment?

No. It means the stock was a successful speculation. There is a profound difference. A great investment is one where the business generates cash returns that compound for shareholders over time. A successful speculation is one where you buy cheaply and sell to someone willing to pay more.

At S$0.077, the speculation is over. The stock now trades at 1.86x book value -- a premium to the tangible assets that are located in frontier markets with uncertain property rights. The P/E ratio on 2024 attributable earnings is mathematically infinite (profit was S$135K on a S$441M market cap). Even using the more favorable 2023 earnings, the P/E is 32x -- expensive for a commodity cement producer in Central Asia.

The Klarman framework asks: "What is the downside?" If KZT devalues 20% (a realistic scenario in any year), attributable earnings could go negative. If political risk crystallizes, assets could be seized. If liquidity tightens, the company may not be able to service its S$187M in deferred EPC payables. The downside is 50-100%. The upside requires everything going right: Korcem ramp-up, FX stability, no new competition, continued Central Asian growth.

This is not a risk-reward profile that a value investor should accept.

6. The Patient Investor's Path: Walk Away

Sometimes the most important investment decision is the one you don't make.

International Cement Group is a fascinating business. The story of building cement plants in Central Asia, navigating Kazakh and Tajik politics, creating the region's largest dry-process production network -- it is genuinely impressive entrepreneurship. Ma Zhaoyang and Zhang Zengtao have built something real.

But "impressive entrepreneurship" and "good investment for minority shareholders" are entirely different concepts. The founders of many great businesses have created enormous value for themselves while destroying value for outside investors. The venture capital world is full of such examples. ICG is a public market version of the same phenomenon.

The patient investor's path here is clear: walk away. There is no price at which this stock becomes attractive for a Buffett-style investor, because the structural problems (governance, currency risk, no returns to minorities) cannot be fixed by a lower stock price. A cheaper entry reduces your downside, but it does not create the cash returns that compound wealth over time.

The S$64.7M in annual operating cash flow is real. But it belongs to the controlling shareholders, not to you. And until that changes -- until ICG pays dividends, institutes a buyback, or brings in independent governance -- the correct allocation is zero.

Some opportunities are not opportunities at all. They are lessons in disguise. International Cement Group is one of them.

Executive Summary

International Cement Group is a Singapore-listed cement producer operating primarily in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, with a legacy aluminum extrusion business being wound down. The company has grown aggressively from 1.8 million metric tonnes of annual cement capacity in 2017 to 5.5 million metric tonnes by end-2024, making it the largest dry-process cement producer in Kazakhstan. Revenue has nearly doubled from S$141.6M (2020) to S$263.5M (2024), and operating cash flow has been consistently strong at S$50-79M annually. However, the business faces significant structural risks: massive currency exposure to the Kazakhstani Tenge and Tajikistan Somoni (which devastated 2024 earnings), concentrated operations in politically unstable Central Asian countries, heavy related-party transactions, thin liquidity, no dividend payments, and a corporate structure where the controlling shareholders (Ma Zhaoyang and Zhang Zengtao) wield near-total control through a web of holding companies. The stock trades at a significant discount to book value (P/B ~0.5x based on NTA of S$237.5M vs market cap of S$441M at current prices), but this discount is warranted given the risks. REJECT.

Investment Thesis (3 sentences): International Cement Group is a capital-intensive cement producer in Central Asia with genuine operational scale but crippling currency risk, concentrated country exposure, and governance concerns that make it unsuitable for value investors seeking safety of principal. The 2024 results demonstrate the fragility: despite S$64.7M operating cash flow and S$91.4M gross profit, net profit attributable to shareholders collapsed to S$0.1M due to S$29.8M unrealized FX losses and S$7.6M impairment charges. The business reinvests aggressively with borrowed capital, pays no dividends, and offers minority shareholders no mechanism to realize value.

PHASE 0: Opportunity Identification (Klarman)

Why Does This Opportunity Exist?

Deep discount to book value: The stock trades at roughly 50% of net asset value per share (NAV of S$0.0414 per share vs price of S$0.077 -- though the stock has rallied 328% from lows). The net asset value exceeded market cap by S$140M as at December 2024.
Micro-cap neglect: With a S$441M market cap on the SGX, this stock receives virtually zero institutional coverage. It is too small, too illiquid, and in too obscure a geography for most funds.
Central Asian growth: Kazakhstan's GDP is growing at 3.5%, Tajikistan at 6%, and infrastructure spending in both countries is robust, driven by government programs and foreign investment.
Capacity expansion: The Korcem plant (1.5M MT, US$153M investment) was completed November 2024 and will begin contributing revenue in 2H2025, potentially driving a meaningful step-change in earnings.

Assessment: The opportunity is a trap. The discount to book value reflects genuine risks -- currency exposure, governance concerns, country risk, and capital allocation that prioritizes empire-building over shareholder returns. This is a "value trap" in the classic Klarman sense: cheap for good reasons.

PHASE 1: Risk Analysis (Inversion Thinking)

1. Currency Risk (P=90%, Impact: Variable, Recurring)

This is the dominant risk and it is already manifesting. The Group earns revenue in Kazakhstani Tenge (KZT) and Tajikistan Somoni (TJS) but has significant liabilities denominated in US Dollars (USD) and Chinese Yuan (CNY). In 2024 alone, unrealized FX losses were S$29.8M -- wiping out virtually all shareholder profit. This is not a one-time event: similar losses occurred in 2020 (S$10.8M), and the structural mismatch is permanent. Kazakhstan's economy is oil-dependent, making the KZT inherently volatile. The TJS has a history of sharp devaluations (10% overnight correction in November 2020). There is no hedging program disclosed.

This risk alone should disqualify the stock for conservative investors.

2. Country/Political Risk (P=30%, Impact: -50% to -100%)

Kazakhstan and Tajikistan are authoritarian states with opaque legal systems, high corruption indices, and histories of political instability. In January 2022, Kazakhstan experienced violent protests (Bloody January) that resulted in hundreds of deaths and a state of emergency. Tajikistan borders Afghanistan and has had ongoing security concerns. The Group's subsoil rights (limestone mines) and operating permits are granted by governments that can revoke them. Property rights enforcement is uncertain. There is no mechanism for minority shareholders to protect assets in the event of nationalization or expropriation.

3. Governance and Related-Party Concerns (P=60%, Impact: -20% to -40%)

The corporate structure raises significant concerns:

Controlling shareholders: Ma Zhaoyang (deemed interest in 1.47B shares) and Zhang Zengtao (217.5M direct + 3.15B deemed interest) together control approximately 84% of shares through Victory Gate Ventures Limited.
Related-party transactions: Xi'An Baitong Construction (indirect subsidiary of Zhang Zengtao's family) provided S$843K in maintenance services. Mr. Juraev Rajab Davlatovich (35% NCI holder in Tajikistan) provided S$675K in transportation services.
Loans from controlling shareholders: The Group has significant unsecured loans from Victory Gate Ventures and Ma Zhaoyang, creating potential conflicts of interest.
No dividend policy: Despite generating S$64.7M in operating cash flow in 2024, zero dividends were paid to ordinary shareholders. The stated rationale is capital reinvestment, but this leaves minority shareholders entirely dependent on share price appreciation.
Non-controlling interest dividends: S$16.8M was paid to non-controlling interests (the Tajik and Kazakh local partners) in 2024, while ordinary shareholders received nothing.

4. Liquidity Risk (P=40%, Impact: -30%)

The auditors flagged liquidity risk as a Key Audit Matter. As at December 2024:

Total liabilities: S$325.5M vs shareholders' funds of S$277.7M
Non-current trade payables: S$187.2M (primarily deferred EPC payments for Korcem)
Cash: only S$5.7M
Current ratio: 1.06x (barely adequate)
Debt-to-equity ratio: 1.17x (up from 0.92x in 2023)

The Group relies on internally generated cash flows, borrowings from controlling shareholders, and deferred payment arrangements with EPC contractors. This is not a fortress balance sheet -- it is a leverage-dependent growth structure.

5. Competitive Risk (P=35%, Impact: -15%)

A new cement producer entered the Tajikistan market in 2024, causing a 12.1% decline in Tajikistan revenue. The cement market in Central Asia, while growing, is not a monopoly. Kazakhstan has large domestic producers (including state-linked enterprises) and Russian imports. The Group's competitive advantage is primarily scale and location proximity to demand centers -- real advantages, but not impregnable moats.

6. Asset Impairment Risk (P=50%, Impact: -10%)

The auditors noted that the Group's net asset value exceeded market capitalization by S$140M, indicating potential impairment. The gypsum plasterboard plant in Tajikistan already took a S$7.6M impairment in 2024 due to lower-than-expected demand. If Korcem's ramp-up is slower than planned, further impairments are possible.

Total Risk-Weighted Expected Loss: ~55%

Inversion Section

How could this lose 50%+ permanently?

KZT devaluation of 30%+ (happened before in 2015-2016, 2020)
Political instability in Kazakhstan or Tajikistan leading to asset seizure
Controlling shareholders extracting value through related-party transactions at the expense of minorities
Prolonged cement oversupply in Kazakhstan as new capacity comes online

If I were short, my 3-sentence bear case: International Cement Group is a controlled company where minority shareholders have no voice, no dividends, and no protection against the structural currency mismatch that destroyed 2024 earnings. The controlling shareholders have loaded the company with debt to build capacity that may never generate returns for outside shareholders, while paying themselves through management fees and related-party transactions. The stock trades at a discount to book value because the book value itself may be impaired -- assets located in Central Asian countries with uncertain property rights are not worth the same as assets in Singapore or Switzerland.

Can I state the bear case better than the bears? Yes. The governance concerns are not theoretical -- the structure is designed to concentrate control and cash flow to insiders while leaving minority shareholders with residual claims on illiquid, currency-mismatched assets in frontier markets.

PHASE 2: Financial Analysis

5-Year Financial Summary (S$'000)

Metric	2024	2023	2022	2021	2020
Revenue	263,542	257,398	225,195	181,429	141,626
Gross Profit	91,444	89,970	N/A	N/A	N/A
EBITDA	67,823	60,210	76,601	71,669	54,691
Profit Before Tax	16,587	45,122	46,680	46,723	26,229
Net Profit (attributable)	135	13,676	28,940	26,350	8,788
EPS (S$ cents)	0.002	0.238	0.505	0.459	0.153
Operating Cash Flow	64,733	78,881	63,990	51,959	49,905
CapEx	(39,683)	(38,740)	(47,130)	(60,607)	(26,118)
Cement Volume (M MT)	3.22	3.18	2.83	2.39	1.68

Revenue CAGR (2020-2024): 16.8%

Revenue has nearly doubled in four years, driven by capacity additions (Sharcem 2022, Korcem 2024) and volume growth. However, profitability has not kept pace:

Margin Trends

Margin	2024	2023	2022	2021	2020
EBITDA Margin	25.7%	23.4%	34.0%	39.5%	38.6%
Net Profit Margin	1.0%	10.3%	17.2%	20.6%	13.3%
Gross Margin	34.7%	35.0%	N/A	N/A	N/A

EBITDA margins have compressed from ~39% to ~26% as the Group scaled up. Net margins are wildly volatile due to FX swings. This is a red flag: the business is growing revenue but not consistently growing profits.

Balance Sheet

Item	2024	2023	2022
Total Assets	603,150	557,512	487,530
PP&E	485,281	440,067	356,883
Total Liabilities	325,453	266,494	198,252
Total Equity	277,697	291,018	289,278
Equity (owners)	237,546	244,440	233,956
Cash	5,700	6,478	11,531
Debt-to-Equity	1.17x	0.92x	0.69x
NAV/Share (S$ cents)	4.14	4.26	4.08

The balance sheet has deteriorated significantly. Liabilities grew 64% from 2022 to 2024, primarily to fund Korcem construction. PP&E of S$485M dominates the balance sheet -- these are cement plants in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, and their true liquidation value is unknowable.

Cash Flow Analysis

Item (S$'000)	2024	2023	2022	2021	2020
Operating CF	64,733	78,881	63,990	51,959	49,905
Investing CF	(48,616)	(42,559)	(47,130)	(60,607)	(26,118)
Financing CF	(16,771)	(41,296)	(17,517)	10,776	(25,763)
Free Cash Flow	16,117	36,322	16,860	(8,648)	23,787

The business generates real operating cash flow (5-year cumulative: S$309M). However, capital expenditure has been enormous (5-year cumulative: S$213M), leaving limited free cash flow. And no free cash flow reaches minority shareholders -- it is all reinvested or paid to NCI partners.

ROE and ROIC Analysis

Metric	2024	2023	2022	2021	2020
ROE (attributable)	0.1%	5.7%	12.6%	12.6%	4.4%
ROA	0.4%	4.8%	8.0%	9.5%	5.6%

ROE has been consistently below Buffett's 15% threshold, and the trend is deteriorating as the capital base grows faster than profits. This fails the Buffett quality test.

Buffett Quality Checks

ROE above 15% consistently: FAIL (average ~7.1%)
Consistent earnings growth: FAIL (volatile, collapsed in 2020 and 2024)
Low debt: FAIL (D/E 1.17x and rising)
Durable moat: NARROW (scale and location, but no pricing power or brand loyalty)
Owner earnings positive: PASS (operating CF positive, but FCF minimal)
Dividends to shareholders: FAIL (zero dividends paid, ever)

PHASE 3: Competitive Position and Moat Assessment

Industry Context

The Central Asian cement market is growing, driven by:

Kazakhstan infrastructure spending (3.5% GDP growth, roads, housing, SEZ development)
Tajikistan infrastructure (Rogun Hydropower Project, road network upgrades, 6% GDP growth)
Regional urbanization trends

However, cement is a commodity. The product is undifferentiated. Competition is on price, proximity, and reliability. There are no network effects, no switching costs, and no brand premiums.

ICG's Competitive Position

Advantages:

Scale: 5.5M MT capacity makes ICG the largest dry-process producer in Kazakhstan
Location: Plants near major demand centers (Almaty, Bishkek export route)
Vertical integration: Owns limestone mines and clinker production
Multi-plant network: Geographic diversification within Central Asia

Disadvantages:

New competition: A new producer entered Tajikistan in 2024, immediately reducing ICG's sales volume
No pricing power: Cement selling prices declined in Kazakhstan in 2024
No brand premium: Cement is cement -- buyers care about price and availability
Government dependency: Large portion of demand is from government infrastructure projects

Moat Rating: NONE to NARROW

Scale and location provide modest cost advantages, but these do not constitute a durable moat. Any well-capitalized entrant (Chinese, Russian, or domestic) can build a cement plant and erode margins. The entry of a new competitor in Tajikistan in 2024 demonstrates this vulnerability.

PHASE 4: Valuation

Current Valuation Metrics

Metric	Value
Price	S$0.077
Market Cap	S$441M
P/E (TTM, attributable)	>1000x (essentially N/M)
P/E (2023 attributable)	32.3x
P/B	1.86x (vs owners' equity of S$237.5M)
EV/EBITDA	~6.8x
Price/OCF	6.8x
Dividend Yield	0%

Note: The stock has rallied dramatically (+328% from 52-week low of S$0.013), making it far less compelling than it appeared at lower prices. At S$0.013, the stock was trading at 0.18x book -- that was genuinely cheap. At S$0.077, the discount to book is much smaller and the rally has fully priced in Korcem's potential.

NAV-Based Valuation

Net asset value per share: S$0.0414 (per company's own calculation). Current price: S$0.077 -- a 86% premium to stated NAV.

However, the market was previously valuing the company at a massive discount to NAV. The question is whether NAV itself is reliable, given that it consists primarily of cement plants in frontier markets.

DCF Considerations

Attempting a DCF is problematic because:

Earnings are dominated by unpredictable FX swings
The terminal growth rate depends on Central Asian macro
The appropriate discount rate for Kazakhstan/Tajikistan assets is very high (15-20%)
No cash returns to minority shareholders

If we use normalized EBITDA of S$70M, a 7x EV/EBITDA multiple (appropriate for a commodity cement producer in frontier markets), and deduct net debt, we get:

EV = S$490M
Less net debt ~S$40M (bank borrowings minus cash)
Less NCI claims ~S$40M
Less deferred EPC payables ~S$187M
Equity value = S$223M
Per share = S$0.039

This suggests the stock is overvalued at S$0.077 relative to a conservative EV/EBITDA analysis when all liabilities are properly accounted for.

Intrinsic Value Range

Conservative: S$0.030 (stressed earnings, high discount rate, full liability deduction)
Fair Value: S$0.045 (normalized earnings, moderate multiple)
Optimistic: S$0.065 (Korcem ramp-up succeeds, FX stabilizes, full NAV recovery)

Current price of S$0.077 exceeds even the optimistic scenario.

Verdict

REJECT

International Cement Group fails multiple critical investment criteria:

Governance: Controlling shareholder structure with no dividends, no minority protection, significant related-party transactions
Currency risk: Structural and unhedged FX mismatch has destroyed earnings repeatedly (2020, 2024) and will do so again
Country risk: Assets in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan face political, legal, and regulatory risks that cannot be modeled or hedged
No return to shareholders: Zero dividends paid, all cash reinvested in capacity expansion or distributed to NCI partners
Leverage increasing: Debt-to-equity rising from 0.69x (2022) to 1.17x (2024) as the company builds Korcem on credit
ROE below threshold: 5-year average ROE of ~7%, well below the 15% Buffett minimum
Overvalued post-rally: After a 328% rally, the stock trades above fair value and offers no margin of safety

The business has genuine operational strengths -- real cement plants, growing volumes, strong operating cash flow, strategic locations. But these strengths accrue primarily to the controlling shareholders and NCI partners, not to public minority shareholders. There is no mechanism to realize value: no dividends, no buybacks, no takeover catalyst, and a share register dominated by insiders.

For a value investor, the most important question is: "How do I get my money back?" With International Cement Group, the answer is: you don't, unless the stock price goes up. And the stock has already tripled from its lows.

Do not buy at any price.

Sources: International Cement Group Annual Reports 2020-2024, SGX filings, Deloitte audit reports