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NYT

The New York Times Company:

$79.31 13B market cap March 15, 2026
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The New York Times Company NYT BUFFETT / MUNGER / KLARMAN SUMMARY
1 SNAPSHOT
Price$79.31
Market Cap13B
2 BUSINESS

The New York Times has successfully transformed from a declining print newspaper into a digital subscription powerhouse with 12.8M subscribers, a widening bundle moat (News+Games+Cooking+Athletic+Wirecutter+Audio), and excellent unit economics ($9.72 ARPU, 19.5% operating margin, $551M FCF on $30M CapEx). Berkshire Hathaway's Q4 2025 purchase validates the franchise quality. However, at 37.9x trailing earnings and 4.6x sales, the stock prices in near-perfection, leaving no margin of safety. AI content substitution represents a genuine long-term risk to the core news product. Wait for a 30-40% pullback to the $48-58 range, which would offer a 20-30% margin of safety on a blended intrinsic value of $55-65/share.

3 MOAT WIDE

173-year brand heritage (132 Pulitzers), multi-product bundle (News+Games+Cooking+Athletic+Wirecutter+Audio) creating rising switching costs, 6.5M bundle subscribers (53% of digital base), Wordle daily habit

4 MANAGEMENT
CEO: Meredith Kopit Levien

Excellent - zero debt, conservative 20% FCF payout, 34% dividend growth YoY, modest buybacks, disciplined M&A (Athletic acquisition now integrated), building cash

5 ECONOMICS
20.8% Op Margin
15% ROIC
16.9% ROE
37.9x P/E
0.55B FCF
Net Cash Debt/EBITDA
6 VALUATION
FCF Yield4.2%
DCF Range55 - 65

Overvalued by 22-44%

7 MUNGER INVERSION
Kill Event Severity P() E[Loss]
AI content substitution (ChatGPT/Perplexity) eroding premium journalism moat, OpenAI lawsuit uncertain HIGH - -
Subscriber saturation approaching 15M target ceiling, ARPU resistance at higher price points MED - -
8 KLARMAN LENS
Downside Case

AI content substitution (ChatGPT/Perplexity) eroding premium journalism moat, OpenAI lawsuit uncertain

Why Market Right

AI content aggregators cannibalizing news traffic and subscriptions; Subscriber growth deceleration below 200K/quarter; Recession causing subscription cancellation wave

Catalysts

15M subscriber target by end-2027 validates growth runway; ARPU expansion as promotional subscribers roll to full price; OpenAI lawsuit favorable resolution establishing content IP rights; Accelerating buybacks with $550M+ FCF and clean balance sheet

9 VERDICT WAIT
A- Quality Strong - net cash, zero debt, capital-light model ($30M CapEx/yr), FCF more than doubled in 4 years
Strong Buy$48
Buy$58
Fair Value$65

Accumulate below $58, Strong Buy below $48

🧠 ULTRATHINK Deep Philosophical Analysis

NYT - Ultrathink Analysis

The Core Question

The surface-level question is: "Is The New York Times a good investment?" That question is too easy. Of course it is -- at the right price. The deeper question is: What is the half-life of premium journalism in a world where AI can generate passable news coverage at zero marginal cost?

This is the question that separates the reflexive Buffett-follower (who will chase this stock because Berkshire bought it) from the Munger-style independent thinker (who asks what structural forces are at work and whether the current price already discounts the best-case scenario).

Moat Meditation

The New York Times possesses a genuine moat, but it is a moat of an unusual kind. It is not the moat of scale (The Times is not the largest media company). It is not the moat of network effects (more readers do not make the product exponentially more valuable to other readers). It is not even primarily the moat of switching costs, though this is growing.

The Times' moat is identity. Reading the New York Times is a signifier. It says something about who you are, how you see the world, where you sit in the cultural ecosystem. This is the same moat that luxury brands possess -- you do not buy Hermes because the leather is objectively superior. You buy it because it communicates something. Similarly, an NYT subscription signals intellectual engagement, cosmopolitan values, and belonging to a certain tribe.

This is both enormously powerful and somewhat fragile. It is powerful because identity-based moats resist price sensitivity -- subscribers do not cancel because they found cheaper news elsewhere. They cancel only when The Times no longer represents their identity. It is fragile because identity is cultural, and culture shifts. If The Times becomes associated with bias, irrelevance, or institutional decline, the identity moat erodes faster than any economic moat.

The bundle strategy (Games + Cooking + Athletic + Wirecutter) is management's masterstroke precisely because it diversifies the identity moat with utility moats. You might reconsider your NYT News subscription during a political disagreement. You are far less likely to cancel if doing so also kills your Wordle streak, your recipe collection, and your sports coverage. The bundle converts an emotional subscription into a habitual utility.

At 6.5 million bundle subscribers -- 53% of the digital base -- this strategy is already working. The question is whether the remaining 47% will convert to bundles, or whether they represent a more fickle, promotion-sensitive cohort that will churn.

The Owner's Mindset

Would Buffett own this for 20 years? He literally just bought it, so the answer appears to be yes. But the Buffett endorsement deserves scrutiny rather than deference.

Buffett's track record with media companies is mixed. He owned the Washington Post for decades -- an excellent investment. He also invested in newspapers through Berkshire Media Group and eventually sold the entire portfolio when print economics became untenable. He understood, eventually, that the print newspaper moat had eroded beyond repair.

What attracted him to the Times is likely the same thing that attracted him to the Post decades ago: a trusted brand, pricing power, and an owner-family that thinks in generations, not quarters. The Sulzberger family's dual-class structure is, in Buffett's framework, a feature rather than a bug. It prevents the short-termism that destroys media companies -- the pressure to cut editorial staff, chase clickbait, and monetize the brand until nothing remains.

But here is the Munger-style inversion: the dual-class structure also means minority shareholders are along for the ride with no exit ramp if the family makes poor decisions. And the family's primary loyalty is to journalism, not to shareholders. This is admirable in the abstract and potentially costly in practice. If maintaining editorial excellence requires investments that suppress margins, the family will choose journalism. They will not maximize shareholder value -- they will maximize the institution.

For a Buffett-style owner at a reasonable price, this alignment is fine. You are buying a durable franchise run by people who will protect it. But at 38x earnings, you are paying for a franchise AND for exceptional capital allocation, and you may only get one of the two.

Risk Inversion

The bears will focus on AI, and they may be half-right but for the wrong reasons. AI will not destroy journalism -- it cannot produce investigative reporting, war correspondence, or Pulitzer-winning feature stories. What AI WILL do is commoditize the vast middle ground of news coverage: earnings reports, government announcements, weather, routine political coverage, sports recaps. This is the "commodity news" that fills 60-70% of any newspaper, and it generates traffic that supports the advertising business.

If AI products serve this commodity news faster and more conveniently, NYT's moat does not collapse -- but its revenue model shifts. The subscription justification becomes purely about premium journalism and the bundle utility (Games, Cooking, etc.). The advertising business, which is 22% of revenue and growing 20%+ digitally, is more vulnerable because it depends partly on traffic that AI could redirect.

The deeper risk, the one nobody is discussing, is generational. The median NYT reader is in their 50s. Young people get their news from TikTok, Instagram, and Discord. They do not have the "daily newspaper" habit that NYT's subscription model requires. The Times has tried to address this through Games and The Athletic (which skews younger), but the core news product's demographic profile is aging. In 20 years, will a 25-year-old pay $12/month for a news subscription? History suggests habits formed in youth persist, and the newspaper habit is not being formed.

Valuation Philosophy

The fundamental tension here is the gap between business quality and price. On business quality, NYT scores an A-minus: a clean balance sheet, rising margins, a widening moat, excellent management, and a capital-light model generating $551M in free cash flow on $30M of CapEx. This is a wonderful business.

But wonderful businesses purchased at the wrong price become mediocre investments. At $79.31, the market is pricing in $3+ in EPS growing at 10%+ for the foreseeable future. The implied return at these multiples is roughly 4-5% annually (1/PE + growth), which barely exceeds long-term Treasury yields. You are paying full price for a great business and receiving equity risk with bond-like returns.

Buffett's entry around $55-65 (estimated from the Q4 2025 purchase timing) made much more sense. At those prices, the forward P/E was 18-21x, offering reasonable upside. The stock has rallied 30%+ since Berkshire's disclosure, and the "Buffett premium" is now fully priced in.

The Patient Investor's Path

The path forward is clear but requires the discipline that most investors lack: admire the business, study the numbers, and do nothing. Put NYT on the watchlist with a $48-58 accumulate range and wait for one of the following:

  1. A subscriber growth miss that causes a 20-30% sell-off (the most likely entry point)
  2. An AI-related scare that temporarily depresses the stock (irrational but probable)
  3. A recession that causes broad media sell-offs (2-3 year timeframe)
  4. A market-wide correction that brings all premium-priced quality stocks down

The worst thing an investor can do is buy NYT at $79 because Buffett bought it at $55. That is the social proof bias that Munger warned about -- buying because a guru bought, without understanding that the guru's price was materially different from your price. Buffett's 30% margin of safety at his entry price has become your 30% overvaluation at today's price.

The New York Times is a great business with a durable moat and excellent management. It is not, however, a great investment at current prices. The patient investor's job is to wait until Mr. Market, in one of his periodic fits of pessimism, offers this franchise at 15-18x earnings instead of 38x. That day will come. It always does.

Executive Summary

The New York Times has completed one of the most remarkable business transformations in media history -- converting from a declining print newspaper into a digital subscription powerhouse with 12.8 million subscribers, growing revenue 9% annually, and generating $551 million in free cash flow. The business is high-quality (ROE 17%, operating margin 20%, net cash balance sheet, growing FCF), protected by a genuine brand moat and rising switching costs via its multi-product bundle (News + Games + Cooking + The Athletic + Wirecutter + Audio). Berkshire Hathaway initiated a 3% position in Q4 2025, validating the quality of the franchise.

However, at $79.31, the stock trades at 37.9x trailing earnings, 26.2x forward, and 23.5x EV/EBITDA -- pricing in near-perfection. The intrinsic value range is $55-65, implying the stock is 22-44% overvalued. The Buffett-style investor should admire the business but wait for a meaningful pullback.

Verdict: WAIT -- exceptional business, but significantly overvalued. Accumulate below $58, Strong Buy below $48.


Phase 0: Opportunity Identification (Klarman)

Why Does This Opportunity Exist?

Paradoxically, there is no opportunity at current prices. The stock has rallied 64% in the past year, driven by:

  1. Berkshire Hathaway position disclosure (Feb 2026) -- Buffett's last major buy as CEO created a "Buffett bump"
  2. Accelerating digital subscriber growth -- 1.4M net new subs in 2025, crossing 12.8M total
  3. Margin expansion -- Operating margins expanding from 8.7% (2022) to 20.8% (2025 TTM)
  4. Narrative shift -- The market finally recognizes NYT as a tech/subscription company, not a newspaper

The opportunity will emerge when: (a) a subscriber growth quarter disappoints, (b) advertising revenue softens in a recession, (c) the AI-content-scraping narrative causes a panic, or (d) the Berkshire "Buffett bump" fades and momentum investors rotate.


Phase 1: Risk Analysis (Inversion Thinking)

How Could This Investment Lose 50%+ Permanently?

  1. AI content substitution -- If ChatGPT, Perplexity, or similar tools can aggregate and summarize news as well as NYT journalists, the premium content moat erodes. NYT spent $13.3M on AI litigation in 2025 (+23%), but a legal loss or inability to enforce IP could undermine the entire subscription model.

  2. Subscriber saturation and churn -- At 12.8M digital subs, NYT has ~40% penetration of its addressable English-speaking, digitally-engaged, news-consuming audience (est. 30-35M globally). Growth could decelerate sharply. ARPU of $9.68/month faces resistance -- users may resist price increases, particularly for The Athletic (which many consider less essential).

  3. Secular media attention erosion -- Competition for attention from TikTok, YouTube, podcasts, and social media is structural. Younger demographics may never develop the "daily newspaper" habit that drives NYT's subscription model.

  4. Dual-class share structure -- The Sulzberger family controls voting power through Class B shares. While this protects editorial independence, it also means minority shareholders have no governance influence. Capital allocation decisions could prioritize family interests or editorial mission over shareholder returns.

  5. Recession risk -- Digital subscriptions are semi-discretionary. In a deep recession, consumers cancel subscriptions. NYT's $9.72/month ARPU x 12.8M subs = $1.5B in digital sub revenue. Even a 5-10% cancellation wave would hit revenue significantly.

Bear Case (3 Sentences)

The New York Times trades at 38x earnings for a business growing revenue 9% and earnings 6% -- a premium that prices in years of flawless execution. AI content aggregators are already cannibalizing news traffic, the OpenAI lawsuit is uncertain, and subscriber growth could hit a wall at 15M. At 4.6x sales for a media company, the valuation assumes tech-like growth with no tech-like total addressable market.


Phase 2: Financial Analysis

Income Statement (5 Years, $B)

Year Revenue Gross Margin Op Margin Net Margin Rev Growth
2025 2.82 47.8% 16.0% 12.2% 9.2%
2024 2.59 49.4% 13.6% 11.4% 6.5%
2023 2.43 48.5% 11.4% 9.6% 5.2%
2022 2.31 47.6% 8.7% 7.5% 11.6%
2021 2.07 49.9% 12.9% 10.6% -

Key observations:

  • Revenue CAGR (5yr): 6.4%
  • Operating margin expanding steadily from 8.7% trough (2022, post-Athletic acquisition) to 16.0%
  • Gross margins stable ~48-50%, demonstrating pricing discipline
  • 2025 adjusted operating margin was 19.5% per management reporting

Balance Sheet

Year Assets Equity Cash Debt D/E
2025 3.0B 2.0B 0.3B 0.0B 0.47
2024 2.8B 1.9B 0.2B 0.0B 0.47
2023 2.7B 1.8B 0.3B 0.0B 0.54
2022 2.5B 1.6B 0.2B 0.1B 0.58
2021 2.6B 1.5B 0.3B 0.1B 0.67

Financial Fortress Assessment: STRONG

  • Essentially zero net debt (paid off remaining debt)
  • D/E declining from 0.67 to 0.47
  • Cash position covers any short-term needs
  • No financial stress risk whatsoever

Cash Flow

Year Operating CF CapEx FCF Dividends Buybacks (est.)
2025 0.58B 0.03B 0.55B 0.11B ~0.15B
2024 0.41B 0.03B 0.38B 0.08B ~0.10B
2023 0.36B 0.02B 0.34B 0.07B ~0.07B
2022 0.15B 0.04B 0.11B 0.06B -
2021 0.27B 0.03B 0.23B 0.05B -

FCF observations:

  • FCF has more than doubled from $0.23B to $0.55B in 4 years
  • Capital-light model: CapEx only $30M/yr (~1% of revenue)
  • Dividend payout ratio: ~20% of FCF (very conservative)
  • Substantial room for dividend growth and buybacks

Return on Equity Analysis

Year ROE
2025 16.9%
2024 15.3%
2023 12.8%
2022 10.8%
2021 14.6%
5yr Avg 14.1%

ROE of 16.9% passes Buffett's 15% threshold and is improving. The 5-year average of 14.1% is slightly below the threshold, dragged down by the 2022-2023 Athletic acquisition integration period. On a going-forward basis, ROE should sustainably exceed 15%.

Owner Earnings Calculation

Net Income (2025):          $344M (est. from 12.2% net margin on $2.82B rev)
+ D&A:                     ~$100M
- Maintenance CapEx:        ~$30M
- Working Capital Changes:  ~$10M
= Owner Earnings:          ~$404M

Owner Earnings / Share:    $404M / 160M = $2.53/share

Conservative Value (10x):  $25.30
Fair Value (15x):          $37.95
Premium Value (20x):       $50.60

Valuation Trinity

1. DCF (Conservative)

Assumptions:

  • Owner Earnings: $404M growing at 8% for 5 years, then 4% perpetuity
  • Discount rate: 10%
  • Terminal multiple: 15x
Year 1-5 PV: $404M x [1.08/1.10 + 1.08^2/1.10^2 + ... ] = ~$1.76B
Terminal Value: $404M x 1.08^5 x 15 / 1.10^5 = ~$5.54B
Total PV: ~$7.30B
Per Share: $7.30B / 160M = ~$45.63

2. Owner Earnings Valuation

At 15x owner earnings: $2.53 x 15 = $37.95 At 20x owner earnings (premium for quality): $2.53 x 20 = $50.60 At 25x owner earnings (market's current implied): $2.53 x 25 = $63.25

3. Comparable Valuation

Metric NYT Netflix Spotify Warner Bros
P/E (TTM) 37.9x 45x 80x 10x
P/S 4.6x 10x 5x 0.5x
Op Margin 20.8% 28% 12% 10%
Rev Growth 9% 16% 20% -5%

NYT trades at a significant premium to traditional media but a discount to streaming platforms. The question is which peer group is more appropriate.

4. Private Market Value

A strategic acquirer (tech company seeking content) might pay 20-25x EBITDA. At ~$550M adjusted EBITDA, that implies $11-14B, or $69-88/share. However, the dual-class structure makes an acquisition impossible without Sulzberger family consent, which is extremely unlikely. Private market value is academic.

Valuation Summary

Method Value/Share vs Current ($79.31)
Owner Earnings (15x) $37.95 -52% overvalued
DCF (Conservative) $45.63 -42% overvalued
Owner Earnings (20x) $50.60 -36% overvalued
Owner Earnings (25x) $63.25 -20% overvalued
Blended Intrinsic Value $55-65 -22% to -44% overvalued

Margin of Safety: NEGATIVE (-22% to -44%)

The stock would need to fall to ~$46-52 for a 20% margin of safety, or ~$39-46 for a 30% margin of safety.


Phase 3: Moat Analysis

Moat Sources

1. Brand (Wide, Durable)

  • "The New York Times" is arguably the strongest journalism brand globally
  • 173-year brand heritage, Pulitzer Prize factory (132 Pulitzers)
  • The brand IS the product -- you cannot replicate NYT journalism without the NYT brand
  • Brand strength enables premium pricing ($9.72 ARPU vs free alternatives)
  • Duration: 15+ years

2. Switching Costs (Narrow but Widening)

  • The multi-product bundle (News + Games + Cooking + Athletic + Wirecutter + Audio) creates increasing switching costs
  • 6.5M bundle subscribers (53% of digital base) -- these users are deeply embedded
  • Wordle has 4M+ daily players -- a daily habit is a powerful retention mechanism
  • NYT Cooking has become the recipe book for millions of households
  • Duration: 10+ years (widening)

3. Content Network Effect (Narrow)

  • More subscribers fund more journalism, which attracts more subscribers
  • This is a virtuous cycle but NOT a true network effect -- the product doesn't become more valuable per user with more users
  • However, subscriber data enables better personalization and ad targeting
  • Duration: 10+ years

Moat Durability Assessment

Threat Severity (1-5) Timeline Company Mitigation
AI content substitution 4 3-5 years OpenAI lawsuit, in-house AI tools, unique journalism
Social media attention 3 Ongoing Bundle strategy, Games/Cooking habit formation
Subscriber saturation 3 3-5 years International expansion, product additions
New entrant (e.g., Substack) 2 Ongoing NYT brand still dominates premium tier
Print revenue decline 2 5-10 years Digital now 73% of ad revenue, declining print is manageable

10-Year Moat Trajectory: STABLE to SLIGHTLY WIDENING

The bundle strategy is a genuine moat-widening move. The combination of Games + Cooking + Athletic creates a "utility bundle" that is more resilient than any single product. The key risk is AI, which could undermine the core news product.


Phase 4: Management & Incentive Analysis

CEO: Meredith Kopit Levien

  • Tenure: 5+ years as CEO (since Sept 2020)
  • Background: Former advertising executive, deep understanding of digital monetization
  • Track Record: Exceptional. Under her leadership:
    • Digital subscribers grew from ~7M to 12.8M
    • Acquired The Athletic ($550M, 2022) -- now integrated
    • Revenue grew from $1.8B to $2.8B
    • Operating margins expanded from 8.7% to 20%
    • FCF grew from $0.11B to $0.55B
  • Insider ownership: CEO owns ~0.04% directly ($4M worth). Low in absolute terms but typical for a family-controlled company.

Sulzberger Family Control

The Sulzberger family controls NYT through Class B shares with superior voting rights. A.G. Sulzberger serves as Chairman and Publisher. This dual-class structure is both a strength and a risk:

  • Strength: Protects editorial independence, long-term thinking, mission-driven culture
  • Risk: Minority shareholders have no governance voice. Family may prioritize journalism mission over profit maximization.

Capital Allocation

Use 2025 Assessment
Dividends $0.11B (~20% of FCF) Conservative payout, rapidly growing ($0.67/share in 2025, up 34% vs 2024)
Buybacks ~$0.15B Modest, reasonable
M&A None (digesting Athletic) Disciplined
Organic Investment $0.03B CapEx Capital-light
Retained ~$0.26B Building cash

Capital allocation is excellent -- conservative, disciplined, and shareholder-friendly. The rapid dividend growth (from $0.16/share in 2016 to $0.67 in 2025) signals confidence in future cash flows.


Phase 5: Catalyst Analysis

Positive Catalysts

  1. 15M subscriber target by end-2027 -- If achieved, validates the growth thesis and could push ARPU higher
  2. Continued ARPU expansion -- As promotional subscribers roll off, ARPU could reach $11-12, boosting revenue without subscriber growth
  3. OpenAI lawsuit resolution -- A favorable outcome would establish content ownership rights and potentially create licensing revenue
  4. Accelerating buybacks -- With $550M+ FCF and a clean balance sheet, buybacks could accelerate significantly
  5. International expansion -- NYT is primarily US-focused; 234 countries but most subscribers are US-based

Negative Catalysts

  1. AI content substitution -- Google/OpenAI/Perplexity could reduce the need for direct NYT subscriptions
  2. Subscriber growth deceleration -- Any quarter showing <200K net adds would spook the market
  3. Recession -- Semi-discretionary subscriptions vulnerable to consumer belt-tightening
  4. Berkshire sells -- If post-Buffett Berkshire trims the position, momentum investors would follow

Phase 6: Megatrend Resilience

Megatrend Score Notes
China Tech Superiority +1 Immune -- domestic US media business
Europe Degrowth +1 Immune -- minimal European exposure
American Protectionism +1 Benefits -- US-centric domestic business
AI/Automation -1 Exposed -- AI content substitution is primary risk
Demographics/Aging 0 Neutral -- older readers more loyal, younger readers harder to acquire
Fiscal Crisis 0 Neutral -- subscription model somewhat resilient
Energy Transition +1 Immune -- digital-first, minimal energy footprint

Total Score: +3 | Tier 2 "Resilient"


Phase 7: Decision Synthesis

Price Targets

Intrinsic Value (Blended):     $55-65/share
Strong Buy:                    $39-46/share (30% MOS)
Accumulate:                    $44-52/share (20% MOS)
Fair Value:                    $55-65/share
Take Profits:                  $66-78/share (20% above IV)
Current Price:                 $79.31 (22-44% ABOVE fair value)

Entry Price Calculation

Using blended IV of $60 (midpoint):

  • Strong Buy: $60 x 0.70 = $42 (needs -47% decline)
  • Accumulate: $60 x 0.80 = $48 (needs -39% decline)

Using optimistic IV of $65:

  • Strong Buy: $65 x 0.70 = $46 (needs -42% decline)
  • Accumulate: $65 x 0.80 = $52 (needs -34% decline)

More realistically, using forward P/E:

  • At 20x forward earnings (~$3.03 EPS est.): $60.60
  • At 18x forward earnings: $54.54
  • At 15x forward earnings: $45.45

Recommended entry: Accumulate at $52-58, Strong Buy at $42-48

Expected Return Scenarios

Scenario Probability 3yr Return Weighted
Bull (20M subs, 25% margins) 20% +30% +6%
Base (15M subs, 22% margins) 50% -10% -5%
Bear (sub growth stalls, AI risk) 25% -35% -9%
Disaster (sub losses, moat erosion) 5% -60% -3%
Expected 100% -11%

At current prices, the expected 3-year return is NEGATIVE. This confirms the WAIT recommendation.


Investment Recommendation

INVESTMENT RECOMMENDATION
Company: The New York Times Company    Ticker: NYT
Current Price: $79.31                  Date: March 15, 2026

VALUATION SUMMARY
Owner Earnings (15x):      $37.95    -52% overvalued
Owner Earnings (20x):      $50.60    -36% overvalued
DCF (Conservative):        $45.63    -42% overvalued
Blended IV:                $55-65    -22% to -44% overvalued

RECOMMENDATION:  WAIT

STRONG BUY:     $42-48  (30% MOS, ~15-16x fwd P/E)
ACCUMULATE:     $52-58  (20% MOS, ~18-19x fwd P/E)
FAIR VALUE:     $55-65
TAKE PROFITS:   $78+    (at or near current price)
SELL:           $95+

POSITION SIZE:  2-3% of portfolio (when at entry price)
CATALYST:       Subscriber growth + ARPU expansion (Timeline: 12-24 months)
PRIMARY RISK:   AI content substitution eroding subscription moat
SELL TRIGGER:   Subscriber count declines for 2+ consecutive quarters

Sources

API Data Retrieved

Source Data Date
AlphaVantage Income Statement (5yr annual + quarterly) March 2026
AlphaVantage Balance Sheet (5yr annual + quarterly) March 2026
AlphaVantage Cash Flow (5yr annual + quarterly) March 2026
yfinance Historical prices (5yr daily) March 2026
yfinance Company overview, dividends March 2026

Web Sources

Source Key Data
CNBC / NYT Q4 2025 earnings 12.8M subs, $2.82B revenue, 19.5% adj op margin
SEC 10-K filing (2025) Subscriber metrics, ARPU, AI risk factors, litigation spend
Berkshire Hathaway 13-F (Q4 2025) 5.1M shares purchased, ~$350M position, 3% stake
SF Examiner / industry press 1.4M net new digital subscribers in 2025
StockTitan / SEC filings 15M subscriber target by 2027, AI content risks

Processed Data Files

File Location
financial-summary.md research/analyses/NYT/data/financial-summary.md
price-summary.md research/analyses/NYT/data/price-summary.md
company-overview.md research/analyses/NYT/data/company-overview.md