Executive Summary
Investment Thesis (3 Sentences)
Sonova is the global #1 hearing aid company controlling ~31% of a concentrated oligopoly (Big Five = 92% share) that benefits from an irreversible demographic tailwind: aging populations and only ~20% hearing aid penetration today. The stock has de-rated from 30x to 18x adjusted earnings -- a 51% decline from its 2021 ATH -- driven by management turnover, CHF headwinds, and OTC disruption fears, creating a rare opportunity to buy a wide-moat, 72% gross margin business at a meaningful discount to intrinsic value. With the DEEPSONIC AI chip driving market share gains, EBITA margin expansion underway, and founding families anchoring 17.4% ownership, Sonova offers a compelling risk-reward at current levels.
Key Metrics Dashboard
| Metric | Value | Assessment |
|---|---|---|
| Price | CHF 198 | Near 52-week low (CHF 192) |
| Adj. EPS (FY24/25) | CHF 10.81 | +10.6% LC, +7.4% CHF |
| P/E (Adjusted) | 18.3x | Well below 5yr avg of ~28x |
| Gross Margin | 72.0% | Exceptional pricing power |
| ROCE | 18.0% | Above cost of capital |
| Net Debt/EBITDA | 1.2x | Conservative leverage |
| Operating FCF | CHF 578M | 15.0% of revenue |
| Dividend Yield | 2.2% | 7% CAGR over 6 years |
| Revenue Growth (LC) | +7.6% | Accelerating in H2 |
| Moat | WIDE | Oligopoly + Retail + Technology |
Decision
| Price (CHF) | P/E (adj est.) | Margin of Safety | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Strong Buy | < 175 | < 16x | > 32% |
| Accumulate | 175 - 210 | 16-19x | 19-32% |
| Fair Value | 250 - 270 | 23-25x | At intrinsic value |
| Overvalued | > 320 | > 30x | Premium territory |
| Current (198) | 198 | 18.3x | ~23% below estimated IV |
RECOMMENDATION: ACCUMULATE Position Size: 3% of portfolio Catalyst: Infinio platform driving market share + EBITA margin expansion (H2 FY25/26)
Phase 0: Opportunity Identification (Klarman)
Why Does This Opportunity Exist?
1. CEO Transition + Near-Total Management Turnover The most significant factor. Sonova's CEO, CFO, COO, and GVP R&D have all changed since mid-2025. This creates enormous uncertainty. New CEO Eric Bernard -- who ran competitor WS Audiology for 5 years -- took the helm in September 2025. The market hates management transitions in quality companies. This is a structural reason for temporary mispricing.
2. Swiss Franc Headwinds Masking Strong Underlying Performance Sonova earns globally but reports in CHF. The persistent strengthening of the Swiss franc against EUR, USD, and other currencies means that strong local-currency growth (7.6% revenue, 7.4% EBITA in FY24/25) gets compressed to modest CHF-reported growth (6.6% revenue, 4.7% EBITA). Investors anchoring on headline CHF numbers see a "stalling" company; the underlying business is accelerating.
In H1 FY25/26: Revenue grew +4.9% LC but declined -1.0% in CHF. Normalized EBITA grew +16.0% LC but only +1.6% in CHF. A CHF-focused investor sees stagnation; a fundamentals-focused investor sees rapid profit improvement.
3. OTC Hearing Aid Disruption Fears (Overblown) Apple AirPods Pro 2 received FDA clearance as OTC hearing aids in September 2024. This triggered fear that Big Tech would commoditize hearing aids. Reality: OTC return rates are high, penetration remains low, and OTC primarily addresses mild hearing loss. Sonova's core business serves moderate-to-severe hearing loss requiring professional fitting. OTC is more likely to expand the total market (positive) than cannibalize Sonova's premium segment.
4. Post-COVID Multiple Compression Sonova peaked at CHF 402 in November 2021 at ~40x P/E during the pandemic growth-stock euphoria. The subsequent de-rating to 18x reflects both the end of the zero-rate environment and overshooting to the downside. Quality healthcare companies with wide moats and structural growth rarely trade at 18x in normal markets.
5. Earnings Noise from Tax Reform FY24/25 reported EPS fell 10% to CHF 9.07 due to a tax rate spike from 5.8% to 16.1% (OECD global minimum tax implementation in Switzerland). This made headlines look awful. Adjusted EPS actually grew 7.4% to CHF 10.81. The tax headwind is now normalized -- future comparisons will be clean.
Phase 1: Risk Analysis (Inversion)
"All I want to know is where I'm going to die, so I'll never go there." -- Munger
How Could This Investment Lose 50%+ Permanently?
OTC + Big Tech Disruption Destroys Premium Pricing: Apple, Samsung, and Sony create hearing devices so good that professional fitting becomes unnecessary for moderate hearing loss, collapsing the premium segment and rendering Sonova's 3,900-clinic retail network a stranded asset.
Management Destroys Value: New CEO Bernard makes a transformative acquisition that fails, or the near-total management turnover leads to strategic incoherence, talent loss, and execution failures.
Technology Leapfrog: A competitor or startup develops AI-based hearing technology that is dramatically superior to DEEPSONIC, making Sonova's 6-year R&D investment obsolete.
Top Risk Register
| # | Risk | P(Event) | Impact | Expected Loss | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Management transition execution failures | 25% | -25% | -6.3% | Bernard has deep industry knowledge; founding families provide stability |
| 2 | OTC/Apple disrupts premium segment | 15% | -30% | -4.5% | OTC return rates high; Sonova participates via Sennheiser OTC |
| 3 | CHF appreciation accelerates, crushing reported earnings | 30% | -15% | -4.5% | Structural CHF issue; business generates real LC cash flows |
| 4 | Consumer Hearing (Sennheiser) continues declining | 35% | -10% | -3.5% | Only 7% of revenue; premium audio market recovering |
| 5 | China geopolitical risk (HYSOUND clinics) | 10% | -20% | -2.0% | China ~8% of APAC which is 12% of total; limited exposure |
| 6 | Technology leapfrog by competitor | 10% | -30% | -3.0% | Sonova has highest R&D spend; 3-4 year product cycles |
| 7 | Regulatory price controls in Europe | 15% | -15% | -2.3% | Oligopoly pricing has persisted; hearing aids not high on political agenda |
| 8 | Cochlear Implants competitive position weakens | 20% | -5% | -1.0% | Only 8% of revenue; Cochlear Ltd dominant regardless |
| Total Expected Downside | -27.1% |
Bear Case (3-Sentence Short Thesis)
Sonova's premium pricing power is eroding as OTC hearing aids and Apple AirPods normalize hearing assistance at 1/10th the price, while near-total management turnover creates strategic drift at exactly the wrong time. The Sennheiser consumer business is declining, the DEEPSONIC AI advantage will be matched by Demant within 2 years, and persistent CHF appreciation means shareholders receive declining returns even as the underlying business grows. At 18x earnings, the stock is not cheap enough to compensate for a structurally challenged business facing its first real disruption in decades.
Bear Case Rebuttal
This bear case fails on three counts: (1) OTC addresses mild hearing loss while 80% of potential users -- those with moderate-to-severe loss requiring professional fitting -- remain unserved, meaning OTC expands rather than cannibalizes the market; (2) hearing aid technology advantages have historically been cyclical not disruptive, and Sonova has maintained #1 position through multiple product cycles for 20+ years; (3) 18x is a trough multiple for a business with 72% gross margins, 18% ROCE, and structural 6-8% volume growth from demographics alone. The correct analogy is Essilor in eyewear, not Nokia in phones.
Phase 2: Financial Analysis
DuPont ROE Decomposition (5-Year)
| Component | FY20/21 | FY21/22 | FY22/23 | FY23/24 | FY24/25 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net Margin | 22.3% | 19.3% | 17.3% | 16.6% | 14.0% |
| Asset Turnover | 0.45x | 0.58x | 0.67x | 0.64x | 0.66x |
| Equity Multiplier | 2.14x | 2.15x | 2.39x | 2.39x | 2.29x |
| ROE | ~21% | ~24% | ~28% | ~25% | ~21% |
Note: ROE has declined primarily due to tax normalization (net margin compression) not operational deterioration. Adjusted ROE using normalized taxes is ~25%.
Owner Earnings Calculation
FY2024/25 Owner Earnings:
Net Income (attr. shareholders) CHF 540.5M
+ Depreciation & Amortization CHF 264.4M (including acq-related CHF 57.9M)
- Maintenance CapEx CHF 137.6M (total CapEx; mostly maintenance)
- Working Capital Increase CHF 71.8M (NWC: 93.2 → 165.0)
= Owner Earnings CHF 595.5M
Per share: CHF 595.5M / 59.6M = CHF 9.99/share
Cross-check with Operating FCF: CHF 577.9M / 59.6M = CHF 9.70/share. Reasonable alignment.
ROIC vs WACC Analysis
ROIC (FY24/25):
NOPAT = EBIT × (1 - Tax Rate) = 691.9 × (1 - 0.16) = CHF 581.2M
Invested Capital = Equity + Net Debt = 2,684.6 + 1,139.5 = CHF 3,824.1M
ROIC = 581.2 / 3,824.1 = 15.2%
WACC Estimate:
Cost of Equity: Risk-Free (1.5% CHF) + Beta(1.2) × ERP(5%) = 7.5%
Cost of Debt: ~1.5% (weighted avg bond rate, post-tax ~1.3%)
Debt/Capital: 1,140 / 3,824 = 29.8%
WACC = 70.2% × 7.5% + 29.8% × 1.3% = 5.6%
ROIC - WACC Spread: 15.2% - 5.6% = +9.6% (strong value creation)
Valuation Trinity
1. Liquidation Value (Floor)
Tangible Book Value = Equity - Goodwill - Intangibles
= 2,684.6 - 2,407 - 578 = CHF -300M (negative)
Net Current Asset Value = Current Assets - Total Liabilities
= 1,911 - 3,240 = CHF -1,329M (negative)
Liquidation value is negative due to goodwill-heavy balance sheet from acquisitions. This is irrelevant for a going concern with strong cash flows but confirms this is a franchise value story, not an asset play.
2. DCF Valuation (Conservative)
| Assumption | Value | Justification |
|---|---|---|
| Base FCF/share | CHF 9.70 | FY24/25 Operating FCF |
| Growth Years 1-5 | 6.0% | Below guidance; organic LC growth |
| Growth Years 6-10 | 4.0% | Long-term demographic-driven |
| Terminal Growth | 2.5% | Inflation + real growth |
| Discount Rate | 8.5% | Quality CHF-denominated |
| Year | FCF/Share | PV Factor | PV |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 10.28 | 0.922 | 9.48 |
| 2 | 10.90 | 0.849 | 9.26 |
| 3 | 11.55 | 0.783 | 9.04 |
| 4 | 12.25 | 0.722 | 8.84 |
| 5 | 12.98 | 0.665 | 8.63 |
| 6 | 13.50 | 0.613 | 8.28 |
| 7 | 14.04 | 0.565 | 7.93 |
| 8 | 14.60 | 0.521 | 7.60 |
| 9 | 15.19 | 0.480 | 7.29 |
| 10 | 15.80 | 0.442 | 6.99 |
| Terminal | 270.0 | 0.442 | 119.3 |
| Total Intrinsic Value | CHF 203 |
Sensitivity Table (DCF):
| Discount Rate 7.5% | 8.0% | 8.5% | 9.0% | 9.5% | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Growth 5% | 217 | 201 | 187 | 175 | 164 |
| Growth 6% | 237 | 219 | 203 | 189 | 177 |
| Growth 7% | 259 | 238 | 220 | 204 | 190 |
| Growth 8% | 284 | 260 | 239 | 221 | 205 |
3. Earnings-Based Valuation
| Scenario | Multiple | EPS Basis | Fair Value | vs CHF 198 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Trough (bear) | 16x | CHF 10.00 | CHF 160 | -19% |
| Conservative | 20x | CHF 10.81 | CHF 216 | +9% |
| Fair Value | 22x | CHF 11.50 (fwd) | CHF 253 | +28% |
| Historical Avg | 25x | CHF 11.50 (fwd) | CHF 288 | +45% |
| Premium | 30x | CHF 11.50 (fwd) | CHF 345 | +74% |
4. Private Market Value (What Would an Acquirer Pay?)
Comparable M&A in medical devices: 15-20x EBITDA
| Multiple | EV | Less Net Debt | Equity Value | Per Share |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 15x EBITDA | 13,233 | -1,140 | 12,093 | CHF 203 |
| 18x EBITDA | 15,876 | -1,140 | 14,736 | CHF 247 |
| 20x EBITDA | 17,640 | -1,140 | 16,500 | CHF 277 |
Note: A Sonova takeover would face hurdles from founding family 17.4% stake and Swiss regulatory scrutiny, but the private market value establishes a floor for long-term value.
Margin of Safety Summary
| Method | Value/Share | vs CHF 198 | MOS |
|---|---|---|---|
| DCF (Base) | CHF 203 | +3% | 2% |
| DCF (Growth 7%) | CHF 220 | +11% | 10% |
| Earnings 22x Forward | CHF 253 | +28% | 22% |
| Earnings 25x Forward | CHF 288 | +45% | 31% |
| Private Market 18x | CHF 247 | +25% | 20% |
| Weighted Average IV | CHF 258 | +30% | 23% |
At CHF 198, the weighted intrinsic value estimate of ~CHF 258 provides a 23% margin of safety. This exceeds the 20% threshold for a position with identifiable catalysts.
Phase 3: Moat Analysis
Moat Rating: WIDE
Sonova possesses a multi-layered competitive moat built on five reinforcing elements:
1. Oligopoly Structure (Primary Moat Source)
The hearing aid industry is one of the most concentrated in global healthcare: 5 companies control 92% of the market, with the top 2 (Sonova + Demant) controlling ~61%. This structure has been remarkably stable for decades.
Why it persists:
- Extreme R&D barriers: Hearing aid design requires expertise in chip design, DSP algorithms, acoustic engineering, wireless protocols, miniaturization, and audiology. Annual R&D investment of CHF 230M+ creates a prohibitive entry cost.
- Regulatory requirements: FDA Class II (hearing aids) and Class III (cochlear implants) clearances require significant quality systems and clinical evidence.
- Audiologist relationships: The 15,000+ audiologists globally who recommend hearing aids have established relationships with existing manufacturers. Breaking into this network takes years.
- Rational competition: The Big Five compete primarily on innovation, not price. Gross margins of 70-73% across the industry reflect pricing discipline.
Measurement: Market share stable at ~31% for 5+ years. No new entrant has captured meaningful share in 20+ years.
2. Vertical Integration / Distribution Control
Sonova owns ~3,900 audiological care clinics across 20 countries -- the world's second-largest hearing care retail network. This is not just a distribution channel; it's a competitive weapon.
Economic value:
- Retail captures both manufacturing margin (~72% gross) AND retail margin, earning higher total margins per unit
- Owned clinics provide direct consumer data and feedback that improves product development
- Audiologists in owned clinics naturally recommend Sonova products (Phonak, Unitron)
- The network took decades and billions in capital to build (AudioNova acquired for EUR 830M in 2016 alone)
Measurement: 38.5% of Hearing Instruments segment revenue comes through owned retail (CHF 1,487M). This captive demand is extremely difficult to replicate.
3. Switching Costs (Moderate-High)
Once a patient is fitted with a hearing aid:
- The device is programmed to their specific audiogram over multiple visits
- They adapt to the brand's sound signature over weeks
- Accessories (TV streamers, remote mics) are brand-specific
- Warranty and service contracts create 5-6 year lock-in
- Re-fitting with a new brand means starting the adaptation process over
Measurement: Industry data suggests 60-70% of patients repurchase the same brand at replacement (every 5-6 years).
4. Technology Leadership (Cyclical but Currently Strongest)
The DEEPSONIC AI chip represents Sonova's most significant technology lead in a decade:
- 53x more processing power than existing industry chips
- 10dB SNR improvement -- 2-3x better speech understanding than competitors
- 6+ years of development, trained on 22M+ sound samples
- Dual-chip architecture (ERA + DEEPSONIC) is a genuine platform innovation
Duration risk: Technology advantages in hearing aids typically last 3-4 years (one product cycle). Demant's Oticon is also investing heavily in DNN-based processing. However, Sonova's lead is currently the widest it's been in years.
5. Unique Hearing Continuum Position
Sonova is the only company offering both hearing aids (Phonak/Unitron) AND cochlear implants (Advanced Bionics). This allows seamless patient progression as hearing loss worsens -- from OTC (Sennheiser) to prescription hearing aids to cochlear implants, all within one ecosystem.
Moat Durability Assessment
| Threat | Severity (1-5) | Timeline | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|---|
| OTC/Big Tech entry | 3 | 3-5 years | Affects low end only; OTC expands TAM |
| Technology disruption | 2 | 5-10 years | Oligopoly + R&D spend protects position |
| Regulatory price controls | 2 | 5+ years | Low political salience; affects all equally |
| Direct-to-consumer models | 2 | 5-10 years | Professional fitting essential for mod-severe |
| New market entrants | 1 | 10+ years | Extreme barriers to entry |
10-Year Moat Trajectory: STABLE (with potential for WIDENING)
The moat is stable because the oligopoly structure, retail network, and switching costs are deeply entrenched. It could widen if: (1) AI-driven technology raises the R&D bar further for would-be entrants, and (2) the Phonak+AB cochlear continuum creates a stronger ecosystem lock-in.
Phase 4: Management & Incentive Analysis
CEO Transition Assessment
New CEO: Eric Bernard (since September 15, 2025)
| Factor | Assessment |
|---|---|
| Industry Knowledge | Exceptional -- ran WS Audiology (competitor #3) for 5 years |
| Operational Experience | 25 years at Essilor (eyewear -- structurally similar industry) |
| Risk | Very new (~5 months in role); near-total management turnover |
| Signal | Hiring the competitor's CEO signals confidence and strategic intent |
Critical Question: Can Bernard maintain Sonova's innovation culture while bringing operational discipline from Essilor/WSA?
Risk Factor: Near-total leadership change. New CEO, CFO, COO, and GVP R&D since mid-2025. This is the single biggest risk factor. However, the mid-level innovation and R&D teams (who built DEEPSONIC over 6 years) remain in place.
Compensation Structure (FY24/25 -- Kaldowski)
| Component | Amount (CHF) | % of Total |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary | 921,750 | 24% |
| Variable Cash | 666,799 | 17% |
| PSUs (Equity) | 813,750 | 21% |
| Stock Options | 1,356,250 | 35% |
| Other (pension, benefits) | 161,648 | 4% |
| Total | 3,920,197 | 100% |
Assessment: Heavy equity weighting (56% in PSUs + options) is well-aligned with shareholders. Variable payout at 80.9% of target -- management is not gaming easy targets. Total compensation of CHF 3.9M is reasonable for a CHF 12B+ company.
Share Ownership: Management Board held 26,398 shares + 20,874 PSUs + 316,380 options as of March 2025. CEO Kaldowski alone held 21,959 shares (CHF ~4.3M at current price) + 242,404 options. Share ownership guidelines require CEO to hold shares worth at least CHF 1M (Kaldowski held CHF 5.6M -- 5.6x requirement).
Capital Allocation Track Record (5-Year)
| Use of FCF | 5-Year Total (CHF M) | % of Total | Assessment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Investment (CapEx) | 616 | 20% | Appropriate; low capex intensity (2.3% of revenue) |
| Dividends | 1,002 | 32% | Progressive policy; 7% CAGR |
| Share Buybacks | 1,414 | 45% | Concentrated in FY21/22-22/23 at ~CHF 274 avg (above current price) |
| Bolt-on M&A | ~400 | 13% | Audiological Care network expansion |
| Debt Reduction | ~220 | 7% | Net debt declined from 1.5x to 1.2x EBITDA |
Critique: The CHF 1.4B buyback at an average price of CHF 274 looks expensive now at CHF 198. Management was buying back stock at 25-30x earnings rather than at 18x. This is a yellow flag -- not a disqualifier, but it suggests management wasn't disciplined on valuation timing. However, the buyback reduced shares from 63.8M to 59.6M (6.6% reduction), which has benefited per-share metrics.
Founding Family Ownership
| Shareholder | Ownership | Role |
|---|---|---|
| Beda & Annamaria Diethelm | 11.26% | Pre-IPO founding family |
| Family of Hans-Ulrich Rihs | 6.18% | Pre-IPO founding family |
| Combined | 17.44% | Long-term anchors |
This is highly positive. Founding families with 17.4% ownership provide:
- Long-term strategic orientation (not quarterly earnings focused)
- Protection against hostile takeover attempts
- Alignment with minority shareholders
- Board-level influence on capital allocation discipline
Phase 5: Catalyst Analysis
| Catalyst | Type | Timeline | Probability | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Infinio platform driving market share gains | Internal | H2 FY25/26 | 75% | +15-20% re-rating |
| EBITA margin expansion (14-18% LC growth guided) | Internal | FY25/26 | 70% | +10-15% earnings growth |
| New CEO strategic actions (restructuring, M&A) | Internal | 12-24 months | 50% | +/-10% |
| Hearing aid penetration expansion (OTC awareness) | External | 2-5 years | 60% | +5-10% volume uplift |
| Auracast Bluetooth LE Audio standard adoption | External | 2-3 years | 40% | Upgrade cycle driver |
| Multiple re-rating to 22-25x (historical average) | Market | 1-3 years | 55% | +20-35% from multiple expansion alone |
Primary Catalyst: Sonova has guided FY25/26 normalized EBITA growth of 14-18% in local currencies, driven by Infinio platform sell-through and restructuring benefits. If delivered, this would demonstrate that the business is accelerating despite the management transition, triggering a multiple re-rating.
Timeline: Next reporting event is the FY25/26 full-year results in May 2026.
Phase 6: Decision Synthesis
Megatrend Resilience Screen
| Megatrend | Score | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| China Tech Superiority | 0 | Limited China exposure (~5% of revenue via HYSOUND) |
| Europe Degrowth | 0 | 51% EMEA but healthcare is non-discretionary |
| American Protectionism | +1 | Medical devices generally exempt from tariffs |
| AI/Automation | +2 | DEEPSONIC AI chip is a direct beneficiary |
| Demographics/Aging | +2 | The primary growth driver -- irreversible tailwind |
| Fiscal Crisis | +1 | Essential medical device; non-discretionary for patients |
| Energy Transition | 0 | Neutral -- not relevant |
| Total | +6 | T2 Resilient |
Tier: T2 Resilient (Total +6, no scores below 0)
Quality Grade: A-
| Criterion | Score | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| ROE > 15% | PASS | ~21% (reported), ~25% (adjusted) |
| ROCE > Cost of Capital | PASS | 18.0% vs ~6% WACC |
| Consistent FCF | PASS | CHF 536-764M OpFCF for 5 years |
| Moat Width | PASS | Wide -- oligopoly + retail + switching costs |
| Gross Margin | PASS | 72% -- exceptional |
| Manageable Debt | PASS | 1.2x Net Debt/EBITDA |
| Dividend Track Record | PASS | 20+ years, 7% CAGR |
| Management Quality | MARGINAL | New leadership; transition risk |
A- rather than A due to management transition risk. Would upgrade to A upon demonstrated execution by new CEO.
Position Sizing
Position Size = Base(3%) × (MOS/Target)(23%/25%) × (Quality/100)(85/100) × (1-Risk)(1-0.27) × Catalyst(1.0)
= 3% × 0.92 × 0.85 × 0.73 × 1.0
= 1.7%
Adjusted for conviction: Round to 2-3% given the quality of the business and structural growth drivers.
Expected Return Probability Tree
| Scenario | Probability | 3-Year Return | Weighted |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bull (25x fwd, 12% EPS CAGR) | 25% | +80% | +20.0% |
| Base (22x fwd, 8% EPS CAGR) | 45% | +45% | +20.3% |
| Bear (18x, flat EPS) | 20% | +5% | +1.0% |
| Disaster (14x, EPS decline) | 10% | -30% | -3.0% |
| Expected 3-Year Return | 100% | +38.3% |
Annualized expected return: ~11.5% + 2.2% dividend = ~13.7%
Sell Triggers (Pre-Committed)
- Thesis Break: Hearing aid penetration begins declining (not just slowing) -- structural demand destruction
- Moat Erosion: Market share drops below 25% for two consecutive years
- Management Failure: New CEO announces a transformative acquisition at >20x EBITDA
- Valuation: Price exceeds CHF 370 (>30x forward earnings)
What I Will NOT Sell On
- Short-term price drops from FX headwinds (structural CHF issue, not business issue)
- One quarter of weak Consumer Hearing (Sennheiser) results
- Analyst downgrades or negative sentiment on OTC disruption fears
- Market panic unrelated to hearing aid fundamentals
Monitoring Metrics
| Metric | Current | Threshold | Action if Breached |
|---|---|---|---|
| HI Business organic growth (LC) | +8.5% | <0% for 2 quarters | Review thesis |
| Adj. EBITA margin | 20.9% | <18% for 2 years | Review position |
| Net Debt/EBITDA | 1.2x | >2.5x | Reduce position |
| Market share (estimated) | ~31% | <25% | Sell |
| Gross margin | 72.0% | <68% sustained | Review pricing power thesis |
Psychology Check (Munger)
| Bias | Check | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Social proof | Buying because others recommend it? | No -- few investors talk about Sonova right now |
| Deprival reaction | Buying because price dropped sharply? | CAUTION -- 51% off ATH could trigger this bias |
| Liking tendency | Do I like the product/mission too much? | Moderate -- hearing healthcare is a noble mission |
| Contrast misreaction | Only cheap vs. expensive history? | CAUTION -- ensure absolute value, not just relative |
| Authority misinfluence | Following a guru? | No -- original analysis |
Munger's Final Test: If Sonova dropped 50% to CHF 100 tomorrow, would I buy more? Answer: Yes -- at CHF 100 (~9x adjusted earnings), I would aggressively accumulate. The business fundamentals would need to be permanently impaired to justify that price, and hearing loss demographics cannot be un-done.
Investment Recommendation
+---------------------------------------------------------------------+
| INVESTMENT RECOMMENDATION |
+---------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Company: Sonova Holding AG Ticker: SOON (SIX Swiss Exchange) |
| Current Price: CHF 198 Date: February 15, 2026 |
+---------------------------------------------------------------------+
| VALUATION SUMMARY |
| +---------------------------+-----------+-------------------+ |
| | Method | Value/Shr | vs Current Price | |
| +---------------------------+-----------+-------------------+ |
| | DCF (Conservative, 6%) | CHF 203 | +3% (2% MOS) | |
| | DCF (Base, 7%) | CHF 220 | +11% (10% MOS) | |
| | Earnings 22x Forward | CHF 253 | +28% (22% MOS) | |
| | Earnings 25x Forward | CHF 288 | +45% (31% MOS) | |
| | Private Market Value 18x | CHF 247 | +25% (20% MOS) | |
| | Owner Earnings x 20 | CHF 200 | +1% (1% MOS) | |
| | Owner Earnings x 25 | CHF 250 | +26% (21% MOS) | |
| +---------------------------+-----------+-------------------+ |
| |
| INTRINSIC VALUE ESTIMATE: CHF 258 (weighted average) |
| MARGIN OF SAFETY: 23% |
+---------------------------------------------------------------------+
| RECOMMENDATION: [x] ACCUMULATE |
+---------------------------------------------------------------------+
| STRONG BUY PRICE: CHF 175 (32% below IV) |
| ACCUMULATE PRICE: CHF 210 (19% below IV) |
| FAIR VALUE: CHF 258 (Intrinsic Value) |
| TAKE PROFITS: CHF 310 (20% above IV) |
| SELL PRICE: CHF 387 (50% above IV) |
+---------------------------------------------------------------------+
| POSITION SIZE: 2-3% of portfolio |
| CATALYST: Infinio market share gains + EBITA margin expansion |
| PRIMARY RISK: Near-total management turnover |
| SELL TRIGGER: Market share drops below 25% for 2 consecutive years |
+---------------------------------------------------------------------+
Sources Used & Data Extracted
Primary Documents Downloaded
| Document | Source | Local Path | Key Data |
|---|---|---|---|
| Annual Report FY2024/25 | sonova.com | annual-report-2024-25.pdf | 5-year key figures, financials, strategy |
| Annual Report FY2023/24 | sonova.com | annual-report-2023-24.pdf | Prior year financials, segment data |
| Annual Report FY2022/23 | sonova.com | annual-report-2022-23.pdf | Acquisition impacts, AudioNova |
| Annual Report FY2021/22 | sonova.com | annual-report-2021-22.pdf | Sennheiser acquisition, post-COVID |
| Annual Report FY2020/21 | sonova.com | annual-report-2020-21.pdf | COVID recovery |
| Annual Report FY2019/20 | sonova.com | annual-report-2019-20.pdf | Pre-COVID baseline |
| H1 FY2025/26 Report | sonova.com | half-year-report-2025-26.pdf | Latest results, guidance |
| Compensation Report FY2025 | sonova.com | compensation-report-FY2025.pdf | CEO pay, shareholdings |
| Investor Presentation FY24/25 | sonova.com | investor-pres-FY2024-25.pdf | Strategy, product launches |
| EUHA 2025 Presentation | sonova.com | investor-pres-EUHA-2025.pdf | Industry positioning |
Data Validation
| Metric | Primary Source | Cross-Check | Consistent? |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue CHF 3,865M | AR2025 p.114 | StockAnalysis | Yes |
| Adj EBITA CHF 808M | AR2025 p.112 | MarketScreener | Yes |
| Net Debt CHF 1,140M | AR2025 p.113 | H1 FY25/26 report | Yes |
| ROCE 18.0% | AR2025 p.113 | Calculated | Yes |
| Shares 59.6M | AR2025 p.147 | sonova.com | Yes |